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To maintain the Surface Fleet, the Navy spent approximately $7.2 billion in 
FY2015 and requested $7.8 billion for FY2016. In response to years of costs overruns 
and missed deadlines, the Navy wants to make better use of these funds by shifting from 
executing Multi-Ship Multi-Option Contracts with cost-plus fee types to Multi-Award 
contracts with fixed-price fees. The new contract choice will increase competition and 
shift risk to the contractor. This thesis conducts an in-depth analysis of the contract 
change process during execution of depot maintenance availabilities using five ships as 
case studies. It uses lean principles and lessons from buyer-supplier relationship studies 
to recommend improvements and to answer two questions. Is the Navy’s current 
construct prepared to execute a new contract strategy? Is this the best decision to reduce 
cost and meet schedule requirements? The thesis concludes that process improvement is 
required before shifting to a new contract strategy, and that improving the working 
relationship with the contractor is paramount to process improvement.  
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The Navy spent approximately $7.2 billion dollars in fiscal year (FY) 2015 and 
requested $7.8 billion to maintain the surface fleet in FY16 (Department of the Navy, 
15). The department is facing complications with an ever-expanding role for the surface 
fleet coupled with uncertain budget conditions (Beardsley, 2015). Analyzing processes to 
find inefficiencies is a means by which the Navy can satisfy multiple stakeholders, 
successfully complete the nation’s missions, and stay within prescribed budgets.  
There is a history of shifts in the surface Navy’s depot maintenance processes and 
procedures (Balisle, 2010). Currently, the Navy is in the process of shifting from cost 
reimbursement contracts with a multi-ship, multi-option contract (MSMO) award 
structure to a fixed-price contract with a multi-award, multi-option contract (MAC-MO) 
award structure (Duncan & Hartl, 2015). The shift encourages competition from pre-
approved contractors while enforcing strict contract standards, work specifications and 
risk acceptance by the contractor (Duncan & Hartl, 2015).  
When choosing contract types the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) is 
explicit about items that should be considered. For this particular case two items are 
apply:  
 Cost analysis. The government should compare a cost estimate to the 
contractor to provide the basis for negotiations. It is essential to consider 
the amount of uncertainty within the scope of work to apply a fair amount 
of responsibility on the contractor for cost.  
 Type and complexity of the requirement. The higher the complexity 
of the work should result in a higher assumption of risk by the 
government. As a requirement recurs the risk should shift, in time, to the 
contractor.  
(FAR 16.104) 
 The Navy has been conducting maintenance on ships for a long time thus these 
two considerations imply the shift to fixed price contracts based on recurring 
requirements for ship maintenance and a corresponding shift of risk to the contractor is 
logical. 
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 This thesis analyzes the process of changing the contract during execution of 
depot maintenance availabilities using five ships as case studies. It uses lean principles 
and highlights three specific types of waste:  
 Defects (Mistakes)–Multiple areas are identified where defects are 
creating rework and slowing the process.  
 Waiting/Queueing–The theory of constraints shows that the process is not 
optimized and cannot be without increasing resources and increased 
cooperation. 
 Untapped Creativity and Human Potential–Increased use of metrics will 
allow better analysis of the process and objective review of the contractor.  
Buyer-supplier relationship case studies are used to parallel depot maintenance to 
historical examples. Specific areas of concern include: 
 Recurring competition instead of cultivating efficiency  
 Firm focus regarding cost instead of full value chain analysis  
 Communication between the contractor and government is sporadic and 
problem driven 
Methods of improving the relationship and ultimately improving the process are 
recommended.  
The thesis uses the analysis of the process to answer two key questions: Is the 
Navy’s current construct prepared to execute a new contracting strategy? Is this new 
contract strategy the best decision for reducing cost and keeping schedule? Using the 
FAR items for consideration the thesis concludes that process improvement is required, 
as a basis for estimating costs and accurately articulating complex requirements, before 
shifting to a new contract strategy. Additionally, improving the working relationship with 
the contractor is paramount to process improvement.  
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II. THE PROCESS 
The depot maintenance process is delineated in the Joint Fleet Maintenance 
Manual (JFMM; Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015), but I provide a consolidated 
breakdown here to enable the rest of my thesis to be understood in context. The process is 
extensive and incorporates a myriad of players that all have effects on the ultimate 
product that is a definitized contract (Duncan & Hartl, 2015).  
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the depot maintenance process in detail 
by breaking it up into parts. I start with a basic overview of corrective maintenance 
conducted by the Navy. Then, I address the players to include overarching organizations, 
ship’s maintenance teams, their roles and responsibilities. Next, I discuss the advanced 
planning process, including how a work item is formed and how a contract is definitized 
prior to start of a Chief of Naval Operations Directed Selected Restrictive Availability 
(SRA). Finally, I describe execution, which includes the Request for Contract Change 
(RCC) process. This process is the means by which the contract is changed after 
definitization.  
The Business Dictionary defines Definitization as “Final determination of an 
agreement, arrangement, or contract, such as about its cost, duration, scope, and/or go no-
go decision” (Definitization, n.d.). In the case of U.S. Navy ships conducting contracted 
maintenance in a private shipyard, each ship has its own definitized contract which 
encompasses all of the work which is going to be conducted in that specific Availability. 
Whenever each individual work item needs to be changed the entire contract must be 
adjusted to reflect changes in scope, cost or procedure.  
A. THE BASICS 
In this section, I provide a breakdown of the levels of maintenance and the ways 
in which the Navy employs these types of maintenance to accomplish the objective of 
sustaining the surface fleet.  
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1. Levels of Maintenance  
There are different types of maintenance such as preventive, repair or even 
periodic preventive maintenance. This thesis concentrates on repair or corrective 
maintenance. Each type of maintenance can be handled at levels defined in the JFMM 
which are broken down by the entity performing the maintenance.  
a. Organizational Maintenance 
This is the lowest maintenance level. This is maintenance conducted by the 
organization, such as the ship’s crew and is generally the least difficult or time 
consuming (JFMM; Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015). The Navy has strayed from 
this for corrective maintenance, which I will elaborate on in the literature review (Office 
of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), 2010).    
b. Intermediate Maintenance 
Intermediate maintenance is repair work that exceeds organizational-level 
capability or capacity (OPNAV, 2010). The performers of this type of maintenance are 
government employees, in some cases sailors.  In general, this is coordinated by and 
executed by the RMC. (CNRMC, 2012)  
c. Depot Maintenance 
Depot maintenance is “maintenance that requires skills, facilities, or capacities 
normally beyond those of the organizational level and intermediate level, and is 
performed by a naval [shipyard], [private] shipyard original equipment entity/agent, or 
NAVSEA-designated overhaul point.” (OPNAV, 2010)  
d. Emergent Maintenance 
Emergent maintenance is maintenance that is conducted with little or no notice to 
restore a failed mission-essential system or component-to-readiness condition, but does 
not require execution by a naval shipyard/private shipyard. (OPNAV, 2010) 
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2. Availabilities 
Availability is when a ship’s response time capability is reduced to allow 
maintenance to be conducted by outside sources (OPNAV, 2010, p. 24). Availabilities 
can be conducted pierside at a U.S. Navy–controlled maintenance pier or in a 
private/public drydock or shipyard.  
a. CNO-Directed Availabilities (CNO Avail) 
CNO-directed availabilities fall into two categories: major and minor. 
Availabilities of six months or longer in duration that are performed by industrial entity 
under NAVSEA oversight or contract administration is a major Availability. 
Availabilities that are shorter than six months, scheduled by and under SURFOR 
management is a minor availability. Major CNO Availabilities can be large-scale 
overhauls or modernizations including planned, engineered, and incremental 
availabilities. Minor Availabilities include Selected Restricted Availabilities (SRA), 
Docking SRA, Phased Maintenance Availabilities (PMA), Extended Docking SRA 
(EDSRA), or Pre-Inactivation Restricted Availabilities (PIRA). (OPNAV, 2010)  
b. Continuous Maintenance Availabilities (CMAV) 
CMAVs are conducted by Surface Ships for approximately two to six weeks. It is 
generally executed while the ship is in port and is scheduled once per non-deployed 
quarter (OPNAV, 2010). 
For continuity of data and analysis, this thesis concentrates on corrective 
maintenance and modernization conducted at the depot level in CNO directed 
Availabilities. CMAVs inherently have a shorter planning process than a CNO directed 
Availability due to the short time frame in which the Availability is conducted. Due to the 
differences in duration and complexity, I have removed CMAVs from my data analysis to 
ensure the data is not manipulated by the inherent differences in these two types of 
Availabilities.  
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B. THE PLAYERS 
1. The Organizations 
These are the organizations which are intimately involved in the depot 
maintenance process and each should be addressed in turn so that someone can gain a full 
understanding of the process.  
There are multiple players that impact the Surface Navy’s depot maintenance 
program, so I have broken this section up into areas of interest. The first includes the 
organizations so that I establish the stakeholders and the chain of command as it relates to 
reporting requirements and responsibilities. The second section is the Maintenance Team, 
Contracting Team and those members that affect an Availability throughout pre-planning 
and execution. 
a. Commander Naval Surface Forces   
Commander Naval Surface Force (SURFOR) is also known as the Type 
Commander (TYCOM), and their responsibility is to man, train and equip the Navy’s 
surface fleet. Coupled with the RMCs, SURFOR is responsible for budgeting funds for 
alterations, rejuvenation, repair, and maintenance availabilities, and the sustained 
material readiness of its assigned ships. Under the direction of the CNO and assigned 
Operational Commanders, SURFOR and the RMCs manage funds for pre-availability 
planning during the execution of the availabilities. SURFOR works in concert with the 
operational commanders to schedule ships for deployment and other operational 
assignments. In addition, they are actively engaged in scheduling ship repair and planning 
engagements that directly involve the ship (Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015). 
SURFOR provides the planning funds for the assigned ships Maintenance Team 
for availability planning. Once the availability work package has been identified and 
accepted, SURFOR provides the funding for completion of repairs and modifications. 
The Port Engineers, working with their assigned maintenance teams, are responsible for 
oversight of all SURFOR advance planning. They work closely with the contract 
administrative team, known as the contracting team, to execute the terms and conditions 
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of contracts for their assigned ships (Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015). I address the 
Port Engineers’ role in further depth in the maintenance team section.  
b. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 
Responsible to the CNO, NAVSEA’s “basic mission as related to ship 
modernization, repair, and maintenance is to provide acquisition, engineering, logistic 
and material support for the Navy. As the technical and engineering authority for ships of 
the Navy, NAVSEA, in support of the designated Program Executive Office (PEO), is 
responsible for the life cycle management of Navy ships, submarines, craft, and boats, 
including the following” (Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015): 
 Developing maintenance plans for each ship class. 
 Supporting fleet maintenance officers in scheduling ships for 
availabilities. 
 Managing alteration development and executing the NMP. 
 Providing acquisition, engineering and technical authority and Contract 
Administration Quality Assurance Program assistance to the fleet 
maintenance officers and RMCs. 
 Operation of the NSYs, SUPSHIP, and RMC Contracting Offices.  
(Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, p. II-I-3-13) 
 
Figure 1 is a breakdown of the NAVSEA corporate organization chart. This 
provides an overview of where SEA 21, SURFMEPP, SUPSHIP and the RMC are in the 
chain of reporting and authority within the NAVSEA organization. SURFMEPP reports 
to SEA 21, or the Surface Warfare Directorate for NAVSEA. SUPSHIP reports directly 
to the Logistics and Maintenance directorate (NAVSEA 04) for NAVSEA.  
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Figure 1.  Corporate Leadership of Naval Sea Systems Command 
 
This figure illustrates the command structure of Naval Sea Systems Command and the 
rest of the players that report to NAVSEA. Source: Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA). (n.d.2015). NAVSEA corporate leadership [Chart]. Retrieved from 
http://www.navsea.navy.mil/WhoWeAre/Headquarters.aspx  
c. Surface Warfare Directorate of NAVSEA (SEA 21) 
SEA 21 is Commander Naval Sea Systems Command’s 
(COMNAVSEASYSCOM) coordinator of surface ships. Its mission and program 
summary is as follows:  
SEA 21 integrates maintenance strategies, modernization plans, training 
needs, and technical, logistics, and programmatic efforts to best manage 
the lifecycle of U.S. and partner Navy surface ships and systems from fleet 
introduction through transfer or disposal…NAVSEA 21 is the dedicated 
life-cycle management organization for the Navy's in-service surface ships 
and is responsible for managing critical modernization, maintenance, 
training and inactivation programs. SEA 21 provides wholeness to the 
Fleet by serving as the primary technical interface; ensuring surface ships 
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are modernized with the latest technologies and remain mission relevant 
throughout each ship's service life. The organization also maintains 
inactive ships for future disposal, donation, or transfer, to include follow-
on technical support to our partner navies. (NAVSEA, Program Summary, 
Mission Statement, n.d., p. 1) 
d. Regional Maintenance Centers (RMC) 
The Navy RMC is responsible for the administration and technical oversight of 
the contract. This duty is coordinated with the Supervisor of Shipbuilding Conversion 
and Repair (SUPSHIP) (Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, p. II-I-2-3). The 
Commander Regional Maintenance Center is the central authority over the individual 
RMCs. Its mission and goals are as follows: 	
We deliver quality cost-wise material readiness to support U.S. Naval 
forces worldwide…The command leads the RMCs in developing and 
executing standardized maintenance and modernization processes, 
instituting common policies, and standardizing training in an effort to 
sustain a consistent business model across the RMCs and, ultimately, to 
provide cost-effective readiness to the Navy’s surface ship 
fleets…CNRMC is an Echelon III command, reporting directly to the 
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and works 
closely with NAVSEA’s SEA 21 directorate and the Surface Maintenance 
Engineering Planning Program (SURFMEPP) command for planning and 
execution of surface ship maintenance and modernization. (Commander 
Naval Regional Maintenance Center [CNRMC], 2015, p. 1) 
The RMCs have two different responsibilities. They coordinate the Intermediate 
Maintenance and they are the executor of the contracts. These two separate duties are 
why their strategic goals include the following:  
 Support mission readiness by delivering quality ship maintenance on time 
and on cost 
 Become a stronger partner with the surface fleet by delivering measured 
performance 
 Develop our RMC workforce as we reconstitute RMC capability and 
capacity 
 Mentor and return Sailors to the Fleet with Journeyman technical abilities 
 Enhance enterprise-wide understanding of proper maintenance processes 
(CNRMC, 2015) 
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e. Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program (SURFMEPP) 
The mission of SURFMEPP is to “provide centralized surface ship life-cycle 
maintenance engineering, class maintenance and modernization planning, and 
management of maintenance strategies” (NAVSEA, SURFMEPP, Program Summary, 
n.d.,  p. 1). In essence, the purpose of SURFMEPP is to monitor and coordinate Surface 
Ship life-cycle maintenance by creating products which enable maintenance fluidity. 
Some of the products it produces are as follows:  
 Baseline Availability Work Package (BAWP)–This consists of the work 
items required in accordance with the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) 
maintenance cycle for each ship type.  
 Change Management Documentation–This is an analysis and review of 
the risk of deferral of maintenance items to subsequent maintenance 
cycles.  
 Class Maintenance Plan (CMP)–This plan contains the repair and 
assessment tasks required to be performed in preparation for a ship class to 
meet life cycle maintenance and material requirements.  
 CNO Availability Completion Reports–These reports are a review of the 
financial and technical requirements of a completed availability. 
Identification of growth and new work is recorded to support future plans.  
 Master Specification Catalog (MSC)–This is a master catalog of Class 
Standard Work Templates and associated Independent Government 
Estimates to streamline and standardize contract management.  
 Ship Sheets–These are documents of labor and material costs associated 
with each ship’s CNO availability maintenance requirements.  
 Technical Papers–These are a notional plan of a ship’s maintenance.  
(NAVSEA, SURFMEPP, Core Products, n.d.). 
f.  Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP)  
The supervisor of shipbuilding, conversion, and repair (SUPSHIP) is an Echelon 
3 shore command reporting to commander NAVSEA. Their mission is “to administer and 
manage execution of Department of Defense (DOD) contracts awarded to assigned 
commercial entities in the shipbuilding and ship repair industry” (Supervisor of 
Shipbuilding, Conversion & Repair, 2015, p. 1). 
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 Their functions and tasks are as follows: 
 Serve as DOD’s designated Contract Administration Office (CAO) 
responsible for performing Contract Administration Services (CAS) for all 
DoD contracts awarded to assigned contractors. 
 Enforce contract requirements, ensuring contractors, and the government, 
satisfy their contractual obligations. 
 Work with contractors and government activities to facilitate greater 
quality and economy in the products and services being procured. 
 Manage the complexities and unique demands of ship construction and 
nuclear ship repair projects by performing the following non-CAS 
functions for Navy Program Executives Officers (PEOs), the Fleet, and 
NAVSEA headquarters: 
 Project Management: Coordinate response to non-contractual 
emergent problems; coordinate activities of Pre-Commissioning 
Crews, Ship’s Force and other government activities; communicate 
with customers and higher authority regarding matters that may 
impact project execution. 
 Technical Authority: Serve as NAVSEA’s waterfront Technical 
Authority responsible for providing government direction and 
coordination in the resolution of technical issues. 
 Contract Planning and Procurement: Participate in acquisition 
planning and assessment of contractor qualifications. 
 Apply a standard methodology for determining overall physical progress 
of Navy Ships under contract. 
 For each shipbuilding program, apply risk assessment methodology for 
determining the allocation and effective mix of SUPSHIP resources 
(Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion & Repair, 2015, pp. 1–4) 
2. Representation  
The JFMM designates authority in each type of Availability to ensure clear lines 
of responsibility and communication. This thesis concentrates on the CNO Availability 
conducted in Private shipyards. In Table 1, this particular situation designates that the 
RMC and SUPSHIP will share responsibility of Naval Supervisory Authority and the 
Contractor is the Lead Maintenance Activity. These roles and responsibilities are further 
explained below.  
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Table 1.   Authority for Each Availability Type 
  
Source: Executive Director SUBMEPP. (2015). Joint fleet maintenance manual. 
Portsmouth, NH: Department of the Navy, p. II-1-2-4. 
a. Naval Supervisory Authority 
The Naval Supervisory Authority (NSA) is the responsible entity for management 
and verification of all work accomplished by all parties in execution within the given 
availability, and is the main contact for all work. The NSA provides the management 
required to ensure the work in the assigned availability is approved and finished in 
compliance with technical requirements and maintenance/modernization policy. In 
addition, the NSA ensures all assigned work meets the timetable, quality, and 
environmental/safety requirements (Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015). For the 
purposes of this thesis, I concentrate on CNO-directed private availabilities which result 
in sharing of NSA responsibility between SUPSHIP and RMC designated personnel. In 
most cases the NSA is assigned by the Fleet Maintenance Officer and Type Commander 
(SURFOR). An NSA is assigned for any CNO-directed availability and all contracted 





NSA Responsibilities include but are not limited to: 
 Coordination with other Maintenance Activities through an authorized 
MOA. 
 Single point of contact for the LMA and shipboard personnel. 
 Verify completion of work for milestones, key events, end of availability, 
availability departure report based on documentation provided by all 
maintenance activities. 
 Based on the amount of work accomplished, the NSA may also assume 
the role of the LMA.  
 For CNO availabilities, the NSA shall: 
 Participate in all work definition, planning and completion conferences. 
 Facilitate planning efforts. Ensure detailed planning and integration of the 
work package is accomplished to provide a schedule that incorporates the 
work and testing of all organizations involved in the availability. The 
schedule shall address work definition, key events, shipchecks, job 
summary, material preparations and strategy preparations. Identify 
milestones with sufficient detail to measure intermediate progress toward 
each key event. Ensure orientation briefings and training is conducted as 
necessary so that personnel understand applicable project processes and 
requirements. Identify their appropriate points of contact. 
 Prior to availability completion, verify all authorized work has been 
completed unless voided/deferred. For work performed by contractors, 
ensure all provisions of the contract have been fully executed. 
 During work execution, review all changes to specifications and work 
items to ensure requirements are met. 
 Participate in critiques and problem investigations as necessary.  
(JFMM, Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, p. II-1-2-2)  
b. Lead Maintenance Activity 
“The lead maintenance activity is the single activity responsible for work being 
accomplished on U.S. Naval ships during any type of availability. For work conducted 
during periods in which the NSYs or RMCs do not have oversight, an LMA is 
designated” (JFMM, Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, p. II-1-2-5).  Since this thesis 
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concentrates on CNO-directed Availabilities, the contractor serves as the LMA (Table 1). 
LMA Responsibilities include but are not limited to:  
 Conduct or attend routine progress review meetings with all assigned 
repair activities. Identify and resolve coordination problems and work 
conflicts. Advise the appropriate maintenance sponsors (e.g., NSA, 
NAVSEA, TYCOM, AIT Sponsor, Ship’s Program Manager) of 
significant quality, cost and schedule impacts and problems. 
 Coordinate work and testing controls to include Work Authorization 
Forms, tagouts and test sequencing. 
 Integrate the work of all repair activities. For CNO availabilities, this 
includes an integrated schedule. For non-CNO availabilities, an integrated 
schedule may be used, based on the complexity of the work as determined 
by the LMA. The schedule shall ensure adequate time is provided for crew 
training. 
 Report work status to Maintenance Brokers. 
 Request assistance via Maintenance Broker as needed for outside activity 
performance. 
 Coordinate preparations by assigned repair activities for all key events to 
include verification signature checklists of readiness to start. 
 Track progress of all maintenance activities. 
 Coordinate crane operations, pier laydown areas, dry dock work areas and 
resolve other real estate conflicts which may impede efficient execution of 
the availability. 
 Provide sea trials agenda, with all repair activity input, for ship 
Commanding Officer’s concurrence and Type Commander approval. 
 Maintain a list of activities authorized to work on the ship the LMA is 
responsible for and ensure the list is updated weekly or on an as-needed 
basis. Ensure activities working on ship have the proper credentials, work 
schedule and pedigree (authorized maintenance activity) prior to being 
added on the work authorization list. 
 Ensure maintenance activities performing maintenance on assigned ships 
have proper MOA, Standard Work Practices, NAVSEA standard items 
and/or Strategic Systems Programs Alteration authorization in place and 
that the MOA, Standard Work Practices, NAVSEA standard items and/or 
Strategic Systems Programs Alteration authorization address required 
support for work authorizations and work control.  
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 Direct maintenance providers to their proper points of contact. 
 Attend all production/maintenance management meetings to 
communicate/resolve priorities, problems, job interferences and issues. 
 Define, identify and provide resolution to coordination problems and work 
conflicts between the Maintenance Managers, Maintenance Activities, 
Maintenance Brokers and the ship. Provide a copy of all Departures From 
Specifications to Ship’s Force Quality Assurance Officer and the Type 
Commander (TYCOM) N43 organization. 
 Participate in critiques and problem investigations (e.g., Trouble Reports) 
as necessary. 
 Conduct Ship’s Force and contractor orientation briefings and training as 
applicable prior to commencement of shipboard work. 
 Appoint a Ship Safety Officer to chair the Ship Safety Council and 
coordinate work and testing that affects ship’s conditions and prevention 
and protection from fire and flooding  
(JFMM, Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, p. II-1-2-5)  
c. Ship’s Responsibility 
The ship is responsible for the following: 
 Monitor all maintenance activities to ensure they are on the master 
authorization list. 
 Ensure a current master authorization list is maintained by the Ship’s Duty 
Officer. 
 Provide the LMA with information on ship brokered work so all activities 
are placed on the master authorization list. 
(JFMM, Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, p. II-1-2-6)  
OPNAV further defines two more responsibilities of the CO of the ship:  
 Ensure that quality maintenance is performed by other activities by 
providing assistance and oversight, as necessary, to ensure that published 
quality assurance standards are adhered to.  
 Ensure documentation of all maintenance actions, whether accomplished 
by ship's force or by other activities. 
(OPNAV, 2010, p. 2 Encl. 1) 
 16
3. The Maintenance Team 
Each ship is assigned a production team by the RMC that is charged with 
coordinating the ship’s needs with a contractor. The maintenance team’s principal roles 
are as follows:  
 Management of Ship Maintenance which includes validation and 
coordination of the ship’s Current Ship’s Maintenance Project (CSMP) 
and Availability Work Package (AWP). They also coordinate initial 
estimates for work items to facilitate planning of availabilities.  
 Budgeting of Ship Maintenance which includes preparing the Maintenance 
and Modernization Business Plan. This document recommends a budget 
for the ship’s fiscal year requirements.  
 Availability coordination which is developing the plan and coordinating 
scheduled availabilities within the resources provided by the TYCOM.   
 Meet with TYCOM Representatives and SURFMEPP at A-410 to review 
the ship’s BAWP, CSMP, Availability Duration Estimate, active DFSs, 
Class Advisories and routines/services. The CSMP will be reviewed and 
evaluated for branding. 
 Screen and broker any mandatory CMP requirement uploaded to the 
CSMP after Mid Cycle Review (A-410) within ten (10) days of receipt 
into the Information Technology (IT) screening and brokering system.  
 When required, provide CMP configuration data corrections to 
SURFMEPP. 
(JFMM, Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, p. II-I-3-13)  
a. The Port Engineer  (Ashore Ship’s Maintenance Manager) 
The port engineer is also referred to as the ashore maintenance manager in the 
JFMM. Port engineers are assigned by the type commander and are responsible for 
validating, screening, and brokering all maintenance and modernization, including 
assessments, which require off-ship assistance. They must ensure the Project Manager 
(PM) has visibility of all assigned work. There is also a Combat Systems Port Engineer 
who conducts the same functions specifically for Surface Ship Combat Systems. (JFMM, 
Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, p. VII-7-4)  
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Specific items they are accountable and responsible for include the following: 
Accountable:  
 Leads the Maintenance Team and maintains frequent contact with the 
Commanding Officer and conducts personal observations of shipboard 
conditions. Establishes and maintains an effective communications plan 
with the ship during deployment.  
 Validates all off ship maintenance for assigned ship(s), including off-ship 
assessments. 
 Develops initial planning estimates based on information such as return 
costs from similar jobs and Government prepared or approved estimates.  
 Screens/schedules work candidates to the right time period and 
maintenance availability based on the MMBP, operational schedule, 
material readiness requirements and cost benefit analysis.  
 Develops Business Case Analysis and generates applicable Engineering 
Services Request, provides advice and serves as the ship’s point of contact 
for access to technical expertise for all ship maintenance and 
modernization requirements, including the development of Ship Changes. 
(JFMM, Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, p. VII-7-4)  
Responsibilities: 
 Communicates, coordinates and tracks ship and applicable class problems. 
 Makes recommendations to the ship’s Commanding Officer and 
management on any deferred work items.  
 Coordinates maintenance availability scheduling and execution. 
 Develops and schedules work packages. Recommends resolutions to CNO 
Availability scheduling issues. 
 Screens work candidates to appropriate level of maintenance. Reviews 
assessment results for inclusion in work packages. 
 Assists the NSA with technical close out and availability work 
certification. Assists ship in achieving maintenance phase exit criteria. 
 Supports and participates in work specification review. 
(JFMM, Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, p. VII-7-4)  
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b. The Project Manager  
The Project Manager (PM) is the principle representative assigned to the 
maintenance team by the Naval Supervisory Authority, or in this case, the Navy Regional 
Maintenance Center (Table 1). The PM is the administrator of the contract (JFMM, 
Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, p. VII-7-3).  
The JFMM delineates what the PM is accountable for and their responsibilities:  
Accountable: 
 Supports the Ashore Ship’s Maintenance Manager in the performance of 
maintenance and modernization. 
 Accepts or rejects work candidates to scheduled availability periods and 
performing activities in accordance with guidance. Integrates work 
candidates to form optimized work packages. 
 Serves as the advanced planning manager for contracted maintenance 
during CNO availabilities and scheduled CMAVs conducted at contractor 
or Government depots.  
 Briefs Ship’s Force on the status of all work, by work item.  
 Acts as business agent with other activities on availabilities and contracts 
assigned that includes ensuring that TYCOM funds are utilized properly. 
Evaluates all Technical Analysis Reports (TAR) and supports the 
Contracting Officer in contract negotiations. Acts as assistant funds 
administrator (when designated in writing from the RMC Commanding 
Officer) for assigned availabilities and contracts. 
 Documents delay and disruption charges and lessons learned  
 Manages ship repair and modernization work items, job orders and 
contracts assigned by progressing and evaluating all work to anticipate, 
prevent and minimize delays, resolving all problems that affect the end 
cost, quality, schedule and performance of assigned availability or 
contract.  
 Reviews all work accomplished by assigned Shipbuilding Specialists to 
ensure compliance with regulations, directives, instructions, and policies 
as well as to ensure that intended work is practical and necessary.  
 Reviews contractors work schedules, manning curves, material 
ordering/receipt schedules and special tasking/equipment requirements. 
Evaluates contractors' proposals prior to and during contract execution. 
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Takes corrective actions to eliminate conflicts and prevent work 
stoppages. Identifies and initiates action to correct, prevent, and minimize 
delays, resolving all problems that affect quality, schedule and contractor 
performance.  
 Obtains work authorizations for growth and new work. Work 
authorizations may be in the form of naval messages, speed letters, letters, 
other transmittals or documents. In the case of growth work, the 
authorization may be verbal, a memo at a meeting or a telephone call. 
Verbal authorizations should be documented with a memorandum for the 
record. 
 Maintains a ledger notebook or spreadsheet to assist in funds 
administration. For each contract modification initiated in the work 
package, the Project Manager shall show the title of the item, cite the 
proper funding authorization and account and show the Government 
estimate.  
 Reviews contractor condition reports, exceptions list, and contract 
modifications for approval.  
 Coordinates, schedules and administers advance planning functions. 
Analyzes work package to maintain available dates and minimize 
premiums. 
 Coordinates review of both Government and contractor estimates for 
“reasonableness and fairness”. Recommends alternate contracting vehicles 
if applicable.  
 Provides inputs for funding requirements and serves as the Maintenance 
Team funds manager for CNO availability preparation and execution.  
 Prepares the business case analysis for growth and new work 
recommendations and recommends resolutions to the Ashore Ship’s 
Maintenance Manager (Port Engineer). Reviews the authorization and 
funding, and submits information to the contracting officer for negotiation 
on growth and new work.  
 Reviews condition reports and evaluates submitted time and cost estimates 
for accomplishment or deferral in concert with the Ashore Ship’s 
Maintenance Manager's concurrence.  





 Provides supporting information for Business Case Analysis for new 
work.  
 Participates in CSMP/DFS/BAWP mid-cycle reviews, coordinates mid-
deployment shipchecks, and participates in scoping conference  
 Progresses Cost/Schedule Status Reports.  
 Assists with the authorization of growth and new work.  
(JFMM, Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, p. VII-7-3)  
c. The Shipbuilding Specialist 
“Shipbuilding specialists are individuals who possess a primary trade background 
but effectively perform across trade lines in two or more trade skill disciplines. Team 
assignments are made to balance trade expertise appropriately with the type of work in 
the project. A wide variety of comprehensive duties and responsibilities are assigned to 
these individuals who are expected to act as decision-makers with comprehensive 
knowledge of each work item assigned” (Waterfront OPS, 2011, p. 20). Shipbuilding 
Specialists are assigned the following duties and responsibilities, some of which are 
delegated among a group: 
 Attends meetings, resolves production problems, develops scope of work 
requirements, assists in the development of Government TARs and 
negotiation positions, assesses contractor capabilities, work progress and 
performance, provides technical support to the ACO, participates in claims 
avoidance and provides other technical support as required.  
 Receives and investigates contractor reports, assists with the development 
of the Government’s technical response, requests engineering support, 
prepares necessary contract modifications, develops the Government cost 
estimates, estimates the delay and disruption that may occur because of a 
contract modification, assists with negotiation preparation relative to 
TARs and contract modifications (as authorized by the ACO), provides 
the ACO support in negotiations and maintains records of actions taken.  
 Perform/witness Government “G” notification points, identified in the 
work specifications, when the contractor calls them out. Accomplish 
random Product Verification Inspections (PVI) utilizing checklists or an 
attribute system to determine contractor compliance with the quality and 
 21
technical requirements of the work specifications/contract. Write a 
Corrective Action Request when nonconformities are detected.  
 Determines the physical progress, as a percentage of work completed, of 
each work item and each contract modification assigned. This information 
is updated weekly in a comprehensive progress report that is used in 
calculating the contractor’s entitlement to progress payments as well as in 
evaluating the contractor’s schedule performance.  
 Provides positive lessons learned along with feedback related to deficient 
or inefficient work specifications or work authorizations to the appropriate 
planning group for use in improving future procurements.  
 Conducts oversight coordination and inspection of work-related 
environmental issues associated with Ship’s Force and contractor’s 
operations.  
 Conducts safety inspections jointly with the contractor, Ship’s Force and 
Government Environmental Safety and Health (ESH) Representative(s).  
 Maintains a Significant Events Log.  
 Provides written reports to support Award Fee Evaluations and CPARS.  
(JFMM, Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, pp. VII-7-5 —VII-5-6)  
For the entire list of action items for a SBS, see the Appendix.  
 d. The Contracting Officer and Contracting Specialist Team 
There are three categories of contracting officers. The “contracting officer” 
exercises the authority of entering into, administering, and/or terminating contracts and 
makes corresponding determinations and findings. “Administrative Contracting Officer 
(ACO)” and “Termination Contracting Officer” refers to a Contracting Officer who is 
either administering the contracts or settling terminated contracts. “A single contracting 
officer may be responsible for duties in any or all of these areas” (FAR 42.302). 
“[The] ACO is assisted by a contracts specialist and cost monitor who reside in 
close proximity to the location where the Availability is being performed. Administrative 
functions may be delegated to individuals with special technical or trade skill 
backgrounds who will obtain, or have received, additional training in the relevant  
 
 22
contract administration areas” (JFMM, Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, pp. VII-2–
10). This is referred to as the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) certification level and each contracting officer or representative must be 
certified to the level required for their responsibilities. “[The] complex technical 
requirements of ship repair and modernization require the assignment of trade skill and 
technical personnel from a variety of functional disciplines who must work closely with 
the project [manager] and contracting officer to ensure that the specified terms and 
conditions of the contract are complied with and that upon final closure of the contract 
there are no non-conformant or exceptions to the work items except those that have been 
approved for deviation or waiver by the contracting officer” (JFMM, Executive Director 
SUBMEPP, 2015, pp. VII-2-10 —VII-2-12).  
C. ADVANCED PLANNING 
Advanced planning for a CNO-directed Maintenance Availability is conducted in 
accordance with the JFMM, Vol. 2, Chapter 2, Appendix D: Surface Ship Availability 
Milestones. Advanced Planning is important to a smoothly conducted Availability, 
dictates an on-time award, and, if poorly followed can be detrimental to on-time 
completion.  
Two years in advance (A-720), the type commander works with the fleet 
commander to establish the availability schedule. Between this milestone and 18 months 
in advance, Modernization funding is confirmed and then procurement begins to prepare 
for ship changes. At approximately A-420 the planning yards submit funding requests for 
the work that is already assigned. At this point in the process this pertains to major 
alterations that have been planned well in advance by the Maintenance Team such as 
Combat Systems Suite Upgrades. At A-410 SURFMEPP conducts the mid-cycle review 
which determines the major work items required to be conducted in accordance with the 
Baseline Availability Work Package (BAWP). This document takes into account 
historical data and ship class problems to pinpoint the periodic items that need to be 
assessed or repaired. The Maintenance Team is required to address all of the items in the  
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BAWP, either scheduling them in the upcoming availability or deferring them to a later 
date. At the completion of this meeting, the A-360 letter is published addressing these 
items.  
Initial Funding for Planning is provided at this time in conjunction with a Target 
price for the availability which has been established by the TYCOM (SURFOR). At A-
270 incremental funds are released to support Long Lead Time Materials (LLTM) and 50 
percent of all planned work should have been developed and turned over to the planning 
yard. The planning yard for MSMO contracts is the contractor, and it is a third party 
planner for MAC-MO contacts. Well in advance of the Availability start date—170 
days—a Risk Assessment letter is prepared by the RMC, which is sent to the CNRMC 
and TYCOM addressing all risks associated with completion of the Availability. This 
includes Budget, Schedule, Contractor capability, and other pertinent factors affecting the 
contractor’s ability to meet schedule and cost targets. A-120 is known as the “lock” date 
because new work is no longer sent to the planning yards after this date. Two weeks later, 
all work specifications have been written by the planners.  
From A-240 to A-106, specifications are sent from the planners back to the 
government in batches for review. This review ensures the work specification meets 
government requirements and is the actual work that was contracted for. The Project 
Manager, Shipbuilding Specialists, and Port Engineers conduct these reviews and return 
to the planners if needed. A Final specification is generated and included in the contract. 
At 35 days before the contract begins, the entire contract is definitized. Technically, work 
cannot start in the Availability without a definitized contract completed by the 
Authorized Contracting Officer. In later chapters, I address the procedure for starting an 
Availability without a definitized contract (JFMM, Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, 
pp. II-II-2D-1—II-II-2D-27).  
D. EXECUTION PHASE 
During execution of the contract, the contractor leads daily update meetings to 
inform the customer of the status of individual work items executed by the contractor and 
his or her contracted subs. The contractor also uses the Naval Maintenance Database 
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(NMD) to communicate with the government. This system is the means for initiating 
changes to the contract, approving and negotiating materials, man hours and total cost. A 
contract change to adjust cost, schedule, and man-hours expended, or to initiate new work 
starts with a conditions found report (JFMM, Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, pp. 
II-I-3-24—II-I-3-27). 
1. Conditions Found Report or Contractor Furnished Request 
As the contractor comes upon items that are not specified in the work item, he or 
she documents it in a Conditions Found Report (CFR). Contractors are encouraged by the 
government to identify discrepancies on the work site. There is no limitation to the work 
the contractor can point out, which opens up the possibility for erroneous CFRs and 
massive influx at the outset of an Availability. I discuss this further in the analysis of the 
RCC process in Chapter IV (NAASCO, 2012).  
Figure 2 is the first part of a two-part process map that tracks the contract change 
from CFR to COPA. The second part of the process map is Figure 3. Each of these is 
closely mapped and articulated so that further analysis in future chapters can be 
understood in context.  
Figure 2.  RCC Cycle Process Stage 1 
 
This is a map of the process from CFR to COPA prepared by LT Donald Northrup. Data 
for this chart pulled from the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual. Adapted from Executive 
Director SUBMEPP. (2015). Joint fleet maintenance manual. Portsmouth, NH: 
Department of the Navy. 
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When work is beginning, this report can be a confirmation of the conditions 
which existed when the shipcheck was conducted in the planning phase. In some cases, 
the CFR defines a new requirement which was not part of the initial scope of work. For 
example, when the contractor opens a tank or inspects equipment which was in operation 
at the time of the check the scope of work was not likely clearly defined at the time of 
writing.  When this type of CFR is reported, a Request for Contract Change (RCC) must 
be generated by the government.  
By SWRMC instruction SWINST 4730.2B, CFR responses are to be processed in 
less than three days unless there are mitigating circumstances. By NAASCO contract 
Special Terms and Conditions, any condition found which warrants a CFR is required to 
be submitted within three days of discovery (NAASCO, 2012).  
2. Request for Contract Change 
The Shipbuilding Specialist (SBS) is required to review all CFRs for relevance 
and determine the necessity and requirement for generating a RCC. In this determination 
they must also decide whether the work is considered growth work or new work.  
 “Growth Work: Any additional work that is identified after contract award 
or definitization that is related to a work item included in the contract 
award. Growth does not include pre-priced options or reservations that 
were specifically identified in the solicitation or defined package.” 
(Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015) 
 “New Work: Any additional work identified after contract award or 
definitization that is not related to a work item that was included in the 
original contract award.” (Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015) 
Any work that is determined to be new work must be forwarded to TYCOM for 
approval, and any increase in funds outside of the original target for the Availability is 
also required to be approved by the TYCOM.  
The SBS writes the Request for Contract Change using a template that is pulled 
from the Master Specification Catalog (MSC) that is maintained by SURFMEPP. This is 
to ensure standardization and avoidance of missing substance such as standard items. If 
the work is outside of the technical expertise of the SBS, or requires a procedure which 
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must be developed by technical authority, it is forwarded to RMC Code 200 as an 
Engineering Service Request.  
3. Engineering Service Requests 
In-depth technical review is required when a requirement cannot be clearly 
defined by the MT. In some instances a Class or ship issues arises requiring adjudication 
from technical authority which requires an entirely new procedure be developed before 
execution of work. These procedures are known as a Process Control Procedure (PCP) or 
Extended Process Control Procedure (EPCP) for critical systems. A contractor is not 
authorized to commence work without an approved procedure for conducting work 
within the work specification, which would normally be delineated by the MSC (JFMM, 
Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015, p. II-I-3R-2). 
If higher technical authority is required, such as a class-wide issue or an issue that 
is derived from the originating shipyards design decisions, the ESR can be forwarded on 
to NAVSEA technical authority for review. (JFMM, Executive Director SUBMEPP, 
2015, p. II-I-3-37). 
4. Request for Proposal and Change Order Price Analysis  
The SBS develops the RCC and the independent government estimate and then 
forwards these to the Project Manager for review. The PM reviews all RCCs in an 
Availability and then forwards each to the Contracting Specialist as they are ready for 
Request for Proposal (RFP). Once an RFP has been issued, the Contractor prepares the 
Change Order Price Analysis (COPA) which describes the work, man hours, and cost of 
the proposed change to the contract. There is a possibility that this process goes back and 
forth a couple of times. The government may disagree with elements of the COPA and 
they may be able to show historical precedent to disprove the COPA, in which case the 
contractor can adjust the COPA or wait for scope and negotiation to occur. This back and 
forth may occur, which ultimately adds to the RCC cycle time.  
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Figure 3.  RCC Cycle Process from COPA to Modification of Contract 
 
This figure is a map of the process from CFR to COPA prepared by LT Donald Northrup. 
The data for this chart was pulled from the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual: (Executive 
Director SUBMEPP, 2015) 
5. Technical Analysis Review 
If the contractor’s estimate is greater than $750,000, or the ACO directs, a 
Technical Analysis Review (TAR) is required which establishes the details between the 
IGE and the COPA which need to be adjudicated. This is a mechanism for the 
government to ensure all jobs with significant cost increases are closely scrutinized to 
ensure the contractor fully understands the scope of work and has properly allocated the 
man hours, material and costs associated with that work. These can take a couple hours or 
even a few days in some cases while the PM, SBS and contracting team investigate the 
COPA, review historical data and clarify requirements (CNRMC, 2015).  
6. Negotiation 
The ACO and its team of Contracting Specialists confer with the Project Manager 
preparing for negotiations. The preparations involve verifying historical precedence and 
comparable work items executed by the contractor on similar ship classes. This is what is 
known as the Pre-Business Clearance. Hours may be spent in preparation for a 
negotiation which only lasts a few minutes, but this is dependent on the complexity of the 
work and the ability to produce historical data. In addition, there is some time that is 
spent in this stage waiting for available negotiation periods. During certain periods of an 
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availability, such as in the first 60 days where there is an influx of Requests for Contract 
Change, this can be the longest time frame in the process. In this step in the process, there 
could be rescoping discussions to complete as much work as possible within budget or 
work can be deferred to another Availability to wait for available funds (CNRMC, 2015).  
7. Authorization to Proceed to Modification of Contract 
Once negotiations are complete and the contractor and the government agree on 
material costs and man hours expended for a defined scope of work, the government 
issues an authorization to proceed. This is an authorization to start work even though it 
has not been written into the contract yet. This is because each individual change to the 
contract must be processed in order, and then appropriate changes are made to the 
contract in turn. In this time frame, the ACO and their team also prepare the post-
business clearance which is a summary of the negotiations that occurred, the data brought 





III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATIONS  
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) articulates the government rules and 
regulations when acquiring products or services.  
1. Contract Types 
There are multiple contract types defined and regulations for usage of each in the 
FAR, but I only outline the two here that are being used by the Navy for services.  
a. Firm Fixed Price (FFP) 
Firm fixed price contracts were used exclusively in the late 1980’s to through 
early 1990’s. Some of the issues which drove the shift to cost reimbursement contracts 
were schedule flexibility, cost overruns and general relationship between the government 
and the contractor.   
The FAR defines a firm-fixed price contract as follows:  
A firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not subject to any 
adjustment on the basis of the contractor’s cost experience in performing 
the contract. This contract type places upon the contractor maximum risk 
and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss. It provides 
maximum incentive for the contractor to control costs and perform 
effectively and imposes a minimum administrative burden upon the 
contracting parties. The contracting officer may use a firm-fixed-price 
contract in conjunction with an award-fee incentive for performance or 
delivery incentives when the award fee or incentive is based solely on 
factors other than cost. The contract type remains firm-fixed-price when 
used with these incentives (FAR 16.202-1). 
The FAR continues with the following:  
A firm-fixed-price contract is suitable for acquiring commercial items or 
for acquiring other supplies or services on the basis of reasonably definite 
functional or detailed specifications when the contracting officer can 
establish fair and reasonable prices at the outset, such as when  
 There is adequate price competition 
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 There are reasonable price comparisons with prior purchases of the same 
or similar supplies or services made on a competitive basis or supported 
by valid certified cost or pricing data 
 Available cost or pricing information permits realistic estimates of the 
probable costs of performance 
 Performance uncertainties can be identified and reasonable estimates of 
their cost impact can be made, and the contractor is willing to accept a 
firm fixed price representing assumption of the risks involved. 
(FAR 16.202-2)  
b. Cost-Reimbursement  
The Surface Navy is currently using cost-plus-award fee for execution of the 
multi-ship multi-option service contracts. A cost-plus-award-fee contract is defined as: 
[A] cost-reimbursement contract that provides for a fee consisting of (a) a 
base amount (which may be zero) fixed at inception of the contract and (b) 
an award amount, based upon a judgmental evaluation by the Government, 
sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in contract performance. 
(FAR 16.305) 
The FAR continues with the following for cost reimbursement type contracts:  
The contracting officer shall use cost-reimbursement contracts only when- 
 Circumstances do not allow the agency to define its requirements 
sufficiently to allow for a fixed-price type contract  
 Uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be 
estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract 
(FAR 16.301-2) 
Under cost-reimbursement contracts, the government is taking responsibility for 
excess costs incurred in the execution of the contract because the risk is too high for the 
contractor to enter into a fixed-price contract. From a business standpoint, a contractor 
will not enter into a contract where there is high uncertainty in the work specification 
because onus for incurred expenses outside of the specification may reduce profit 
margins. Unless the contractor believes he or she can recoup those expenses via other 
means, such as a request to change the contract, in which case he or she may enter into a 
fixed-price contract with high uncertainty. 
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c. Factors for Consideration 
The FAR list these specific factors for consideration when choosing contract type:  
 If there is effective price competition, realistic pricing should become 
realized and fixed-price contracts should be considered. 
 Price Analysis should be a basis for selection of contract and the degree to 
which the government is able to accurately analyze price should be 
considered as well.  
 Cost analysis is a good basis in the absence of price analysis. The 
government should compare a cost estimate to the contractor to provide 
the basis for negotiations. It is essential to consider the amount of 
uncertainty within the scope of work to apply a fair amount of 
responsibility on the contractor for cost.  
 The higher the complexity of the work should result in a higher 
assumption of risk by the government. As a requirement recurs the risk 
should shift, in time, to the contractor.  
 The level of urgency of the requirement may result in the government 
assuming more of the risk, or it can offer incentives for performance.  
 Long term contracts may dictate economic price adjustments.  
(FAR 16.104) 
2. Award Vehicles 
Award vehicles are the means by which the government solicits for contractor 
proposals. There are certain requirements that preclude a contractor from bidding on the 
contract including experience, capability and labor force. These vehicles have been used 
at different times to attempt to capture advantages for the government (Balisle, 2010).  
a. Multi-Ship Multi-Option contracts 
The Navy is currently executing multi-ship multi-option contracts. In this system, 
it awards a five-year contract to a qualified contractor who becomes the sole source for 
depot maintenance on a specific ship class in a geographic location. For example, British 
Aeronautical Engineering currently holds the contract for Cruisers and Destroyers in San 
Diego, CA (World Maritime News, 2014). Under this Contract type, the contractor also 
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sub-contracts out for work he or she cannot perform, whether it is due to manning issues 
or lack of ability.  
b. Multiple-Award Contract 
“A multiple-award contract (MAC-MO) is a type of indefinite-quantity contract 
which is awarded to several contractors from a single solicitation. Delivery of supplies, or 
performance of services, is then made via an individual delivery/task order placed with 
one of the contractors pursuant to procedures established in the contract. All contractors 
receiving awards under a solicitation are given a fair opportunity to be considered for 
each task/delivery order issued during the life of the contract” (FAR 16.504). To date, 
two of these contracts have been executed. 
B. MULTIPLE AWARD MULTIPLE ORDER CONTRACTS—THE FUTURE 
OF SURFACE NAVY MAINTENANCE PROCUREMENT (DUNCAN & 
HARTL, 2015)  
In June 2015, Duncan and Hartl published their thesis analyzing the performance 
of an MSMO contract against the two pilot MAC-MO contracts that had been conducted 
to date. Due to the limited sample size, they were unable to draw definitive conclusions 
on most of the metrics they assessed. This thesis was conducted with an emphasis on 
contracting and performance which sheds light on the ability of each contract types 
ability to complete work on time and on budget.  
1. Methodology 
Duncan and Hartl (2015) set out to answer two questions:  
 “Are MAC-MO contracts the most efficient and effective contracting 
method for CNO availabilities?”  
 “Are MAC-MO contracts meeting their objectives?”  
(Duncan & Hartl, 2015,  p. 4) 
In addition, they collected a series of lessons learned from CNRMC and published them 
in their thesis.  
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Duncan and Hartl (2015) took the lead from CNRMC and SURFMEPP and used 
four metrics to decide efficiency/effectiveness. These are Cost Growth from New 
Work/Growth Work, On-Time Award, On-Time Completion, and Lost Operational Days. 
Cost Growth is the total cost incurred during a CNO Availability beyond that which was 
definitized in the contract.  On-Time Award is a measurement of the contractor and the 
government’s ability to definitize the contract in accordance with the prescribed schedule 
delineated in the JFMM. On-Time Completion is the ability of the contractor to complete 
the Availability by the date agreed upon in the contract. Lost Operational Days is the 
amount of days a ship loses operationally, also calculated as the number of days beyond 
the originally planned availability duration.  
The researchers consolidated the data from spreadsheets provided by SURFMEPP 
and CNRMC and then took these metrics to make direct comparisons between the FY13, 
FY14, to date FY15 and MACMO data from the two ships which had completed 
availabilities. In this, they used percentage for On-Time Award and On-Time 
Completion, and used averages for the Cost Growth and Lost Operational Days metrics 
(Duncan & Hartl, 2015).   
The objectives used as the basis for the researchers’ second question were  
 Improved work package and requirements generation 
 Increased price competition 
 Separation of the planning function from the execution function to encourage 
consummate behavior 
(Duncan & Hartl, 2015,  p. 4) 
2. Discoveries 
A broad overview of their analysis was that MAC-MO displayed no definitive 
advantage in three out of four of the categories. Results for On-Time Award, On-Time 
Completion, and Lost Operational Days are were considered inconclusive for differing 
reasons. For Growth Work and New Work comparison, Duncan and Hartl (2015) found 
that the difference in performance was statistically significant.  
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The subsequent graphs (Figures 4 through 7) show the collection of data used to 
make the comparisons. The Average Cost Growth for MSMO contracts across the last 
three fiscal years is nearly 50 percent of the total contract as compared to the 21 percent 
performance of the two MAC-MO contracts. This is then extrapolated to realize a 
potential 50–60 percent overall savings. Percentage of On-Time Completion average is 9 
percent better for MAC-MO contracts, but this is not a large enough value to be deemed a 
success. On-Time Completion and Lost Operational Days averages are virtually identical 
and inconclusive (Duncan & Hartl, 2015).  
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Figure 4.  Growth Work and New Work Comparison MAC-MO to MSMO 
 
Source: Duncan, M. E., & Hartl, R. P. (2015). Multiple award, multiple order contracts—
The future of Navy surface maintenance procurement. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
Figure 5.  Average On-Time Award Days Comparison MAC-MO to MSMO 
 
 
Source: Duncan, M. E., & Hartl, R. P. (2015). Multiple award, multiple order contracts—




Figure 6.  Average On-Time Completion Comparison MAC-MO to MSMO 
 
Source: Duncan, M. E., & Hartl, R. P. (2015). Multiple award, multiple order contracts—
The future of Navy surface maintenance procurement. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
Figure 7.  Average Lost Operational Days Comparison MAC-MO to MSMO 
 
Source: Duncan, M. E., & Hartl, R. P. (2015). Multiple award, multiple order contracts—




Duncan and Hartl’s (2015) two research questions were (1) are MAC-MO 
contract more efficient/effective? and (2) are MAC-MO contracts reaching the stated 
objectives? They concluded that the answer to each of the questions was yes and no; their 
explanation was that most of the data was inconclusive for their four metrics of success. 
With the metrics being inconclusive, they could not determine that the objectives were 
being met, with the exception of the control of cost growth reductions. In a later chapter, 
I come back to these conclusions and address the relationships between their findings and 
my own.  
C. PROCESS EFFICIENCY AND SUPPLIER RELATIONS: THE BIG 
PICTURE 
Rendon and Snider (2008) wrote Management of Defense Acquisition Projects 
which speaks to the inherent differences in government acquisition contracting while 
breaking down the acquisition process and its functions. It is also an overview of systems 
engineering in government contracting and some inefficiencies in government 
contracting methods. These books are necessary for basic understanding of business 
process analysis and government contracting, in particular.  
There are a number of famous works completed on making an organization or 
process more efficient. Reengineering the Corporation by Hammer and Champy (1993) 
speaks to business processes and how to evolve them with changing technology and 
techniques. Goldberg and Weiss (2015) wrote The Lean Anthology, a practical primer in 
continual improvement. In this work, the authors break down the Lean process of laying 
out an operation into its component parts and stripping it of inefficiencies to ensure there 
is no wasted movement.  
Toyota, Honda, and their Japanese counterparts championed the lean process and 
served as the natural case study for process efficiency. There were a number of research 
studies conducted in the late ’80s and ’90s to determine why the Japanese automakers 
were so much more efficient than their U.S. counterparts. I break down two of these 
articles that point to supplier management and relations as the reasons for the success of 
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Japanese automakers. Surface Navy depot maintenance and auto manufacturing may not 
inherently alike. However, the lessons learned about the relationship between buyer and 
supplier in an environment of production and the lean process improvement are 
applicable and very useful to this thesis.   
1. Japanese Style Partnerships: Giving Companies a Competitive Edge 
(Dyer & Ouchi, 1993)  
From 1965 to 1989, Japanese automakers increased their market share of 
worldwide auto sales from 3.6 percent to 25.5 percent and they achieved a 20–25 percent 
cost advantage over U.S. automakers. Bain & Company conducted a study in 1984 which 
found that Japanese automakers were able to recognize a 30 percent parts cost advantage 
over their U.S. counterparts for similar-sized vehicles. The difference articulated in this 
article is U.S. automakers use traditional subcontractor relations with short term, arm’s-
length contracts where the supplier is not engaged regarding design and engineering 
practices.  
The Japanese automakers recognize the benefits of a close relationship with their 
suppliers. They engage the supplier early in the development process to collect the 
suppliers ideas before establishing logistics line. The suppliers in turn assume significant 
responsibility and communicate constantly with the buyer. At the time of this article, U.S. 
automakers had reduced some of the gap by consolidating suppliers. By bringing down 
the number of suppliers, large benefits were recognized in less overhead for negotiations 
and lower shipping costs. But, this did not completely close the gap, and it could have 
been a fatal step if not coupled with Japanese strategy.  
It can be a fatal step because reducing the number of suppliers may squeeze the 
market down to a number of “prime” contractors which makes the buyer beholden to the 
price set by the reduced number of suppliers. That is why this step must be coupled with 
a better working relationship with the suppliers. Dyer and Ouchi (1993) tried to 
characterize this Japanese-style partnership (JSP) by answering two questions:  
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 Why are Japanese Style Partnerships more productive than either buying 
supplies or customers (vertically integrating) or rotating business across 
numerous suppliers?  
 Why are Japanese suppliers so cooperative and willing to take risks? 
(Dyer & Ouchi, 1993, p. 53) 
Dyer and Ouchi (1993) defined a JSP as one with the following characteristics:  
 Long term commitments with frequent communication including planned 
process improvement meetings  
 “Mutual assistance and a focus on total cost not just the cost to the buyer” 
(Dyer & Ouchi, 1993, p. 54) 
 “[Making] significant customized investments in plant equipment and 
personnel while sharing technical information” (Dyer & Ouchi, 1993, p. 
52) 
 Regular, honest sharing of technical and cost information to improve 
performance and pricing 
 Trust-building practices such as owning stock, employee sharing, flexible 
legal contracts which support goal congruence and mutual trust          
(Dyer & Ouchi, 1993, p. 52)  
a. Why Are JSPs More Productive?  
To answer the first question regarding JSPs being more efficient, Dyer and Ouchi 
(1993) analyzed three factors: fewer direct suppliers, customized investments, and forced 
competition. As a result of fewer direct supplier JSPs benefit from economies of scale 
and experience curve benefits. Customized investments are those which make the 
supplier more efficient to the buyer. These include building warehouses or plants in close 
proximity to the buyer’s needs, buying manufacturing equipment for the supplier, and 
investing in human capital such as liaisons to help develop inter-agency cooperation.  
Forced competition is a function of keeping the supplier honest. Most companies 
will ensure that there is a second supplier and work to keep that supplier in business. This 
helps to keep innovation and price competitiveness on the table throughout the 
relationship. This forcing function in Japan is viewed as a contrary to their interests, but 
necessary. The supplier does not appreciate the constant competition and drive for 
innovation, but he or she also views the relationship as insurance because he or she is in 
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the pool of active suppliers. This is coupled with an experience curve price reduction to 
create a win-win for the buyer. However, JSPs are more cost focused. So instead of 
attempting to force the supplier to reduce prices, the buyer constantly works with supplier 
to reduce costs, which results in savings for both parties. This is assisted by the constant 
communication with the supplier regarding inefficient processes and cost-cutting ideas.  
b. Why Are Suppliers More Cooperative?  
Suppliers are more cooperative for the following reasons: stable, long-term 
contacts, career path between firms, face-to-face contact, minority ownership, and 
specialized investments. Stable relationships are the foundation of cooperation. If 
Japanese suppliers were forced to re-negotiate their contracts and compete for a contract 
every year there would be no trust between the buyer and supplier. Career paths between 
firms are another way trust is built, because they cultivate the relationships necessary for 
process improvement and innovation. JSPs have career progressions which incorporate 
positions within the supplier’s organization so that employees gain perspective and build 
partner buy in.  
JSPs believe there is no substitute for regularly scheduled face-to-face meetings to 
discuss inefficiencies and develop process improvement. JSPs averaged 7,235 days per 
year of direct contact compared to 1,129 days of face-to-face contact for U.S. companies 
in 1993. Specialized investments are made when the supplier has to purchase equipment 
specific to that buyer. If there is no purpose for the equipment that cannot be redeployed 
for other buyers, then the buyer purchases the equipment for the supplier. Contractually, 
they own the equipment and can recoup it if contracts are lost. This is another exercise in 
trust building because the supplier does not own specialized equipment they will never 
use beyond the specialized part a buyer needs.  
Overall, this article elucidates the specific relationship practices employed by 
Japanese automakers which cultivate an environment of trust. This trust is what breed 
innovation and quality improvement between both companies and results in lower costs 
for all (Dyer & Ouchi, 1993). 
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There are additional articles written about this specific topic which draw the same 
conclusions. These are another article by Dyer for the Harvard Business Review in 1996 
titled “How Chrysler Created an American Keiretsu” and a study by Cucmano and 
Takeishi for the Strategic Management Journal in 1991 titled “Supplier Relations and 
Management: A Survey of Japanese, Japanese-Transplant, and U.S. Auto Plants” 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, I outline the data that is available for analysis and how it relates to 
the process. I display a Value Stream Map and how the different entities interact to 
enable work to proceed. I use case studies to display ship’s performance as it relates to 
process efficiency and then I use lean principles to increase that efficiency.  
The data I display here is primarily focused on process efficiency and does not 
address cost. While cost is important, this thesis concentrates on reducing waste in the 
process to improve without regard for cost. The metrics I use relate to throughput and 
output. Reducing cost and schedule overruns are byproducts of operating the process at 
peak efficiency.  
A. PROCESS MAPPING 
Naval Maintenance Database (NMD) is the enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
tool used by the RMC to coordinate cost and scheduling information with the contractor. 
This system functions as a central database for cost and schedule data and it is the tool 
used to pass CFRs, RCCs, COPAs, ATPs and notification of finalized contract changes as 
revisions occur throughout execution.  
NMD is flawed in certain aspects of data collection because it is largely 
dependent on the user to enter correct and timely information. Additionally, some metrics 
are not prioritized in NMD which allows the user to retroactively enter data points, enter 
estimates instead of accurate data or never enter data points at all. 
During the time I spent at SWRMC interviewing executors of the process, I found 
multiple parties that are actively collecting data beyond what NMD regularly provides. 
They have graciously provided that data for analysis of the process. Members of the 
contracting team for the USS Boxer (BXR) and USS Makin Island (MKI) use active time 
stamps in their communications with the contractor to conduct thorough analysis of 
contractor turnaround times. Members of the USS Wayne E Meyer (WEM) and USS 
Harper’s Ferry (HPR) contracting teams collect similar data. In addition the USS Pearl 
Harbor (PHB) contracting team is incredibly comfortable using and manipulating NMD. 
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They diligently input their data points in the system to monitor their progress throughout 
execution. Each of these ships provides a wealth of data to map the process of reviewing 
and approving an RCC.  
None of the data provided by these ships possesses the granularity necessary to 
completely analyze the process I outline in Chapter II. In light of this lack of data I have 
redesigned the process map to capture the steps in the process which can be analyzed. 
Figure 8 is the template for the redesigned process map.  
Two outside entities, TYCOM Review and SWRMC Code 200 review, had to be 
removed from the process because of the lack of data available. All of the steps internal 
to the RCC review, COPA submission and ATP had to be consolidated.  
Figure 8.  Redesigned Process Map for Analysis  
 
This figure is a map of the entire RCC cycle process from CFR to Contract Modification 
prepared by LT Donald Northrup. The data for this chart was pulled from the Joint Fleet 
Maintenance Manual: (Executive Director SUBMEPP, 2015) 
As outlined in Chapter II, a CFR is generated when the contractor identifies an 
issue and derives a report. Work cannot begin on the identified issue until the CFR has 
been processed and sent to the RMC, an RCC has been subsequently generated, 
negotiated and resolved. An Authorization to Proceed (ATP) serves as notice that the 
government and contractor have agreed on the scope of work and cost data. At this point, 
modification of the contract is not preventing work. For the purposes of analyzing 
schedule creep for the entire availability, I examined the process from the time the 
contractor documents the issue (CFR Submission) until work begins (ATP). Follow on 
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research would benefit from taking into account all steps and parties outlined in Chapter 
II.   
1. Data Standards 
All data for this thesis is analyzed in the context of business days (or work days in 
Microsoft Excel) because the RMC and contractor standards are expressed in business 
days. For example, the standard for CFR submission, for those CFRs resulting in a 
proposed RCC, is 3 business days for MSMO contracts (NAASCO, 2012, p. 6). The 
standard for answering a CFR for a SBS is three business days (Waterfront Operations, 
2011, p. 38). There is likely work that is conducted on the weekends. Attempting to 
normalize the data to account for weekends worked would require analysis of each 
individual work item. Additionally, working on the weekends or holidays does not 
change the number of business days it took to complete the task. Assessing the number of 
man hours spent in this process is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Excel’s NETWORKDAYS function allows for analysis in business days and it 
account for federal holidays. This function is used when calculating the number of work 
days each RCC or CFR spent processing in a particular job in the process. When 
calculating the rate of submission for CFRs and RCCs, the number of report and changes  
submitted in a month is divided by the number of work days in that month to keep all 
data in proper units.  
When calculating the rate of submission of CFRs and the rate of creation of RCCs 
I denote the maximum rate for each ship. In addition, I provide the rate of submission or 
creation at what I call steady state. Once the process is in full production the system 
should flow at steady state. In the beginning of the process, and in the last couple of 
months, rate of influx may significantly decrease. Including these months in the average 
rate of submission brings the overall rate down to a level which is not an accurate 
portrayal of the process. If the rate of influx is less than 10 percent of the maximum in the 
first or last months of the availability, it is not included in the average rate calculation.  
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2. Case Studies  
I liaised with the metrics department at Southwest Regional Maintenance Center 
(SWRMC) to collect data on seven ships. Five of those ships contracting teams collected 
more data beyond what is accessible by NMD. I use these five ships as case studies to 
map out their Value Stream and their process performance.  
a. USS Boxer (LHD-4) 
BXR is a large Amphibious Landing Helicopter Dock and her availability was 
large in scale. The availability consisted of 308 work items, 3085 CFRs, 740 RCCs and 
there were 8 SBSs assigned. Figure 9 is the process map for BXR’s availability with the 
peak throughput rate from the availability noted.  
Figure 9.  BXR Process Map 
 
 
This figure is a process map of the RCC cycle process for the USS Boxer availability 
prepared by LT Donald Northrup. The data for this chart was consolidated from Naval 
Maintenance Database and data collected by the USS Boxer Contracting Team.  
Figure 10 displays the throughput rate for RCCs answered (blue), COPAs 
Submitted (red) and ATPs (orange). CFR submission rates are calculated for each month. 
The highest rate of CFR influx for BXR was 29.64 CFRs per WD in the month of 
August. BXR’s average steady state inflow of CFRs was 16.98 and the highest three 
months produced an average of 24.35 CFRs per business day.  
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Figure 10.  BXR Throughput Analysis 
 
This figure is a chart of the throughput of RCC Submission, COPA Response and ATP 
throughout execution of the USS Boxer availability prepared by LT Donald Northrup. 
The data for this chart was consolidated from Naval Maintenance Database and data kept 
by the USS Boxer contracting team.   
Figure 11 is the process map for BXR; including the data for each job (or step) in 
the process consolidated from the data provided by the BXR contracting team. In this 
model the ATP and Settle steps are combined because the BXR team did not differentiate 
between the two data points in their collection.  
b. USS Harper’s Ferry (LSD-49)  
HPR is a medium-sized Amphibious Landing Ship Dock and her availability was 
medium in scale. The availability consisted of 96 work items, 2145 CFRs, 497 RCCs and 
there were 3 SBSs assigned. Figure 11 is the process map for HPR’s availability with the 
peak throughput rate from each step in the availability noted.  
HPR has a significant theoretical bottleneck at the MT when processing CFRs. 
The contracting team is likely experiencing higher processing times for individual 
COPAs because the output of the MT of RCCs is significantly faster than the output of 
the contractor.  
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Figure 11.  HPR Process Map 
 
 
This figure is a process map of the RCC cycle process for the USS Harper’s Ferry 
availability prepared by LT Donald Northrup. The data for this chart was consolidated 
from Naval Maintenance Database and data collected by the USS Harper’s Ferry 
Contracting Team.  
Figure 12 displays the throughput of the three entities. The MT drastically 
increases output in the first three months, which is closely followed by the contractor. 
The contracting team does not appear to react until nearly three months later after the MT 
peaks in September. This could explain the wait times experienced by HPR in processing 
ATPs. From February to the end of the availability, the three entities closely mimic 
output with the exception of a spike by the contracting team in June.  
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Figure 12.  HPR Throughput Analysis 
 
 
This figure is a chart of the throughput of RCC Submission, COPA Response and ATP 
throughout execution of the USS Harper’s Ferry availability prepared by LT Donald 
Northrup. The data for this chart was consolidated from Naval Maintenance Database and 
data kept by the USS Harper’s Ferry contracting team.   
c. USS Wayne E Meyer (DDG-108) 
WEM is a medium class Guided Missile Destroyer and her availability is the 
smallest in scale for this study. The availability consisted of 83 work items, 642 CFRs, 94 
RCCs and there were 3 SBSs assigned. Figure 14 is process map for WEM’s availability 
with the peak throughput rate from the availability noted.  
In terms of theoretical capacity, WEM’s bottleneck appears to be the MT during 
processing of CFRs. When the CFR rate is normalized by the CFR-RCC conversion rate 
for WEM, the rate of RCC output is 1.16 RCCs/WD. This is considerably slower than the 
rates of the final three steps.  
WEM is also one of the only ships observed that was able to meet the three 
business day requirement for CFR answering. In addition, the MT was able to keep RCC 




















Figure 13.  WEM Process Map with Data 
 
This figure is a process map of the RCC cycle process for the USS Wayne E Meyer 
availability prepared by LT Donald Northrup. The data for this chart was consolidated 
from Naval Maintenance Database and data collected by the USS Wayne E Meyer 
Contracting Team.  
For the contracting team, it appears being the bottleneck in three out of four 
months increased the wait times in the process to 5.29 WDs. The processing rate of the 
three entities follows nicely in this availability and appears to contribute to the overall 
performance of the availability. The WEM PM specified he was in active contact with the 
contractor during execution. There was never a CFR submitted he did not know about 
ahead of time. This can reduce setup times for the MT such as finding historical data, 
preparing MSC templates and preparing estimates. The reduced turnaround times for the 




Figure 14.  WEM Throughput Analysis 
 
This figure is a chart of the throughput of RCC Submission, COPA Response and ATP 
throughout execution of the USS Wayne E Meyer availability prepared by LT Donald 
Northrup. The data for this chart was consolidated from Naval Maintenance Database and 
data kept by the USS Wayne E Meyer contracting team.   
d. USS Makin Island (LHD-8)  
MKI’s availability is on-going but the contracting team diligently collects data 
throughout execution so it warrants inclusion. MKI, like the BXR, is an Amphibious 
Landing Helicopter Dock and her availability was a little smaller than BXR. The 
availability consisted of 173 work items, 2215 CFRs, 547 RCCs and there were 7 SBSs 
assigned. Figure 16 is process map for MKI’s availability with the peak throughput rate 
from each step noted.  
The theoretical throughput displayed in Figure 15 is based off the most output 
experienced in a month. 25.18 is an anomaly because the next highest month realized an 
18.08 CFRs/WD output and an overall steady state average of 16.84. An output of 18.08 
CFRs/WD normalized to the 0.247 conversion rate yields a 4.47 answer rate, which falls 
in line with the RCC influx rate displayed. At 4.47 RCCs/WD, CFR review becomes the 

















MKI displays a large average wait time for the contractor which is likely caused 
by the large number of resubmissions experienced. One hundred resubmissions is 18.3 
percent of all RCCs processed. This is considerably adding to the time needed to process 
changes to the contract.  
MKI was able to meet the CFR answering requirement of three business days but 
displays a considerable increase in processing time for RCCs.  
Figure 15.  MKI Process Map with Data 
 
This figure is a process map of the RCC cycle process for the USS Makin Island 
availability prepared by LT Donald Northrup. The data for this chart was consolidated 
from Naval Maintenance Database and data collected by the USS Makin Island 
Contracting Team.  
Figure 17 displays the throughput of each major step throughout execution of the 
availability to September of this year. For the MKI the contractor and the contracting 
team observed a two-month delay in peak output in response to peak output of RCCs 
from the maintenance team. Both of these parties lagged considerably in throughput rate 
for the first four months before they increased output in the final three months.   
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Figure 16.  MKI Throughput Analysis 
This figure is a chart of the throughput of RCC Submission, COPA Response and ATP 
throughout execution of the USS Makin Island availability prepared by LT Donald 
Northrup. The data for this chart was consolidated from Naval Maintenance Database and 
data kept by the USS Makin Island contracting team.   
e. USS Pearl Harbor (LSD-52)
PHB, like HPR, is a medium-sized Amphibious Landing Ship Dock and her 
availability in on-going. This availability has been extended and has been in the going for 
more than a year. Her availability has grown to 750 work items, 8303 CFRs, 2128 RCCs 
and there are 7 SBSs assigned. I included PHB because of the wealth of data for 
comparison to the other ships in the study. Figure 18 is process map for PHB’s 
availability with the peak throughput rate from each step in the availability noted.  
PHB displays a bottleneck at the MT in processing CFRs closely followed by the 
CT processing ATPs. Voiding 104 RCCs appears to be contributing to the long wait 
times in processing the ATPs. Additionally, the higher output rate for RCCs from the MT 
appears to be contributing to the wait times experienced from the contractor. On average, 
PHB is close to meeting the three-day CFR response requirement and is maintaining 


















Figure 17.  PHB Process Map with Data 
 
This figure is a process map of the RCC cycle process for the USS Pearl Harbor 
availability prepared by LT Donald Northrup. The data for this chart was consolidated 
from Naval Maintenance Database and data collected by the USS Pearl Harbor 
Contracting Team.  
PHBs throughput analysis displays three entities reacting to each other in a 
reciprocal fashion. It appears as if the contractor is lagging about one month in 
throughput and the contracting team is lagging two months in most cases. A regression 
for the contracting team in July appeared to cause a backlog which required three months 
of steadily increasing output. From January to October it appears the three entities are 
close in output, within 10 percent of each other, which more closely imitates a 
functioning manufacturing process.  
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Figure 18.  PHB Throughput Analysis 
 
This figure is a chart of the throughput of RCC Submission, COPA Response and ATP 
throughout execution of the USS Pearl Harbor availability prepared by LT Donald 
Northrup. The data for this chart was consolidated from Naval Maintenance Database and 
data kept by the USS Pearl Harbor contracting team.   
BXR, MKI and WEM appeared to display steady growth in CFR submission and 
RCC creation resulting in a peak closer to the center of the availability. After the peak all 
of these ships declined in production until completion, with the exception of MKI. HPR 
and PHB displayed more rapid initial growth and steady flow throughout the availability.  
3. Comparison of Ships CFR Conversion Rates 
Table 2 is a comparison of each ship’s rate of conversion. The first row is the total 
number of CFRs generated by the contractor divided by the total number of work items to 
start the availability. The second is the total number of RCCs divided by the total number 
of work items to start the availability. The third row is the total number of CFRs divided 
by the total number of RCCs. The last column is the number of CFRs that are specifically 
listed in NMD as recommending an RCC divided by the total number of CFRs for the 



















USS DECATUR (DEC) (DDG 73) and USS HOWARD (HOW) (DDG 83)—both 
DDGs similar to WEM—are listed below but no process maps were created because the 
ships were not collecting process data with the granularity necessary to map the RCC 
cycle process.  
Table 2.   Comparison of Ship’s Rate of CFR Generation and Conversion 
   BXR  DEC  HOW  HPR  MKI  WEM  PHB 
CFR/WI  13.34  16.60  17.47  22.34  13.80  7.73  11.07 
RCC/WI  2.39  2.56  2.68  5.18  3.34  1.13  2.84 
Total CFR/RCC  5.58  6.48  6.51  4.32  4.14  6.83  3.90 
% CFR to RCC Conv.  19.6%  16.3%  11.7%  24.5%  ND  13.6%  ND 
% Accept/Info Only  77.4%  82.4%  87.2%  74.3%  ND  85.2%  ND 
% of G9 RCCs  13.8%  13.5%  70.7%  1.3%  35.9%  49.0%  10.4% 
This table is a comparison between commonly used metrics prepared by LT Donald 
Northrup. The data for this table was consolidated from Naval Maintenance Database.  
 CFR/WI and RCC/WI are potential metrics for efficiency for ships. A large 
portion of CFRs generated are just acknowledged as accepted reports as evidenced by the 
% Accept or Info row. RCCs are accepted changes to the contract and there is potential 
for a lot of those changes to be unforeseeable. These unforeseeable RCCs contribute to 
more work but do not reflect the quality of the requirement in the work specification. 
There are a considerable number of changes which could have been prevented by 
developing a flawless work specification.  
GAP codes are used by the RMC to try and categorize jobs. G9 is the GAP code 
for RCC created due to unforeseen circumstances. The flaw is this GAP code is chosen at 
the discretion of the administrator. For example, HPR is showing that 1.3 percent of all 
RCCs generated were due to unforeseen circumstances which would equate to extremely 
low quality work specifications. This appears to be confirmed by the ratio of RCCs to 
WIs being 5.18 to1 and their CFR to WI ratio being so much higher than the rest of the 
ships in the study. In context, this means 98 of every 100 RCCs could have been planned 
for before the availability. HPR appears to be performing below the standards set by the 
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other five ships but it also appears they are not using the GAP codes in NMD to allow for 
proper metric analysis.  
 WEM, the ship that appears to be performing the best in most aspects analyzed in 
this study displays the lowest RCC to WI ratio and experienced 50 percent of all RCCs 
being unforeseen. In comparison with the other ships, this means that 50 out of every 100 
jobs could have been written to better capture requirements but they still managed to only 
write approximately one RCC for every WI in the availability.  
Ultimately, the more CFRs and RCCs generated the more time spent processing 
administrative tasks instead of verifying contractor performance, conducting check points 
and monitoring man hour and material usage. Logically, there is a correlation between 
high-quality work specifications and reduction in RCCs. It does not appear to be 
displayed here in the data. This could be caused by the lack of usage or lack of clearly 
defined standards for usage of GAP codes by the maintenance and contracting teams. 
The number of accepted changes to the contract throughout execution does speak 
to the complexity of requirements. Changing the contract a minimum of two times six out 
of seven ships speaks to the government’s inability to fully capture the scope of work. 
There are a certain number of changes to the contract which are caused by unforeseen 
circumstances but this cannot be accurately captured without standardized usage of GAP 
codes.   
4. SBS Usage 
The SBS is the monitor of the contractor, the CFR reviewer, the creator of the 
RCC, the initial cost estimator and the trade subject matter expert that liaises with the 
contracting officer prior to negotiation. If the ship uses the function, NMD will track the 
number of CFRs and RCCs assigned to each individual SBS. Table 3 displays the 
percentage of the total CFRs and RCCs which are assigned to each SBS for each ship in 
the study. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to some PMs reviewing RCCs and 
some ship’s possessing interim SBSs who reviewed minimal percentages of CFRs and 
RCCs.  
 58
Table 3.   Ship’s CFR and RCC assignment Table 
 
This table is a comparison of percent RCCs and CFRs assigned to individual SBSs for 
each ship in the study prepared by LT Donald Northrup. The data for this table was 
consolidated from Naval Maintenance Database.  
BXR was a large scope project and there is an SBS which is reviewing over 20 
percent of both the CFRs and the RCCs. On both DEC and HPR there is an SBS that is 
conducting over 50% of the reviews of CFRs, RCCs or both. There are a few different 
explanations for this.  
PMs are distributing the workload to try and allocate work to those that are 
administratively competent. Keeping those SBS that work best administratively in the 
RMC office while others are on the ship conducting ship checks, check points and 
monitoring the contractor. This explanation decouples the inherent knowledge of the 
work item that comes with being the SBS assigned to review, write changes and monitor 
work performance.  
The PM may be allowing the most competent SBSs to shoulder the majority of 
the burden to expedite the process. If this is the case then there is a large disparity in the 
capability of SBSs.  This implies the process will not be capable of executing at a high 
level until the work force is trained to the proper level to distribute work load evenly 
among the work force. In essence, each ship has developed an individual bottleneck due 
to inexperience.  
As an example, Table 4 displays those SBSs with greater than 15 percent CFR 
review responsibility from each ship except WEM. Only two of the 10 SBSs are able to 
SBS 1 SBS 2 SBS 3 SBS 4 SBS 5 SBS 6 SBS 7
BXR CFR 15.1% 9.4% 1.5% 22.5% 7.3% 16.5% 9.0%
BXR RCC 18.1% 12.7% 4.2% 27.9% 12.6% 14.1% 10.4%
DEC CFR 58.1% 5.0% 15.4% 4.8% 4.7% NA NA
DEC RCC 24.0% 24.0% 19.6% 23.5% 7.9% NA NA
HPR CFR 55.6% 26.8% 9.9% NA NA NA NA
HPR RCC 52.8% 25.2% 21.0% NA NA NA NA
HOW CFR 27.4% 26.5% 40.7% NA NA NA NA
HOW RCC
WEM CFR 29.0% 39.6% 31.4% NA NA NA NA
WEM RCC 47.5% 22.8% 29.7% NA NA NA NA
No Data. Personnel not assigned in NMD
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maintain their response times below the three-day prescribed turnaround rate when being 
assigned greater than 15 percent of all CFRs. SBS 4, is assigned to HOW where the 
distribution of CFRs is nearly even because there are three total SBS assigned to the 
availability.    
In any case where they are assigned greater than 40 percent of all CFRs, the SBS 
are not able to maintain turnaround rates less than four days.  
Table 4.   CFR Responsibility and AVG Response Time 
 
This table is a comparison of percent CFRs assigned above 15 percent and AVG response 
time for the BXR, DEC, HOW and HPR prepared by LT Donald Northrup. The data for 
this table was consolidated from Naval Maintenance Database.  
Table 5 displays that the WEM was able to evenly distribute the CFR load across 
the three assigned SBS and they were able to maintain their response times below the 
prescribed rate. In addition, the WEM RCC turnaround average was less than three days 
as seen in Figure 13. 
Table 5.   CFR Responsibility and AVG Response Time for WEM  
 
This table is a comparison of percent CFRs assigned above 15 percent and AVG response 
time for the WEM prepared by LT Donald Northrup. The data for this table was 
consolidated from Naval Maintenance Database.  
SBS 1 SBS 2 SBS 3 SBS 4 SBS 5 SBS 6 SBS 7 SBS 8 SBS 9 SBS 10
% of Total CFRs 58.06% 55.60% 40.67% 27.44% 26.82% 26.46% 22.53% 16.53% 15.42% 15.11%
Response AVG 7.80 4.23 6.41 2.98 6.65 5.46 4.56 3.38 2.61 4.52
SBS 1 SBS 2 SBS 3
% of Total CFRs 29.02% 39.63% 31.36%
Response AVG 2.08 2.17 2.56
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V. MICRO PROCESS ANALYSIS 
A. LEAN PROCESSES AND MUDA 
Muda is the Japanese word for waste and Goldberg and Weiss use this word to 
describe the 8 categories of waste. This thesis specifies three of the waste categories to 
draw attention to those areas most apparent in the study:   
 Waiting and Queuing–Any form of waiting with no production is 
wasteful. In general this is identified as works in progress that are waiting 
to begin the next process. This is the reason why leaning begins with 
slowing the entire process down to the throughput rate of the bottleneck. It 
allows the bottleneck to dictate the pace and the rest of the equipment used 
for other tasks.  
 Mistakes (defects)–Any defects which require rework or remanufacturing 
another product.  
 Untapped creativity and human potential–Thoughtful ideas to remove 
waste can be generated by those operating within the process. Constant 
process improvement requires these ideas and the perseverance of human 
capital.  
(Goldberg & Weiss, 2015, p. 90) 
a. Mistakes (Defects)  
The MKI and BXR case study display a significant element of mistakes. The two 
ships saw 18.3 percent and 13.9 percent of RCCs returned to the contractor for revision 
of their COPAs, respectively. There are a couple of different elements that may 
contribute to resubmissions of COPAs. The contractor may not have understood the 
requirements, historical information was found which showed the COPA to be 
significantly over priced or the work proposed was not what the government requested. In 
any of these cases, communication and process improvement discussions with the 
contractor could lead to less resubmissions and ultimately a better functioning process.  
Cost estimation is a form of defect for this process because there are a number of 
jobs where the cost is not estimated correctly by the government. At the same time this is 
creating double work. When the original cost estimation is incorrect or invalid the CT 
must conduct research of historical data to derive a cost estimate that can be used in 
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negotiation. When the CT has to redo the work conducted by the SBS it invalidates the 
time spent by the SBS, creating waste.  
Proving this specific metric with quantitative data is difficult because the number 
of man hours spent in preparation for negotiation is not tracked. Without the number of 
hours spent in negotiation being tracked a comparison cannot be made to differentiate the 
time spent with an accurate cost estimate versus an inaccurate cost estimate. In addition 
GAP codes are not applied in a standardized manner to ensure tracking of inaccurate 
requirements.  
The proof of inaccurate estimates comes from multiple interviews with PMs and 
ACOs. Multiple PMs specified that inaccurate cost estimates are leading to increased 
wait times on RCCs. ACOs have specified that there are times when they prepare for 
negotiations without a baseline for comparison due to inaccurate cost estimation data. 
Reducing mistakes and defects is dependent on quality control. The PM review is 
the step in the process that is used for quality control. The PM is charged with reviewing 
every RCC and IGE.  
b. Untapped Creativity and Human Potential 
The CTs and in some cases the MTs are collecting and maintaining data to 
improve their processes. A lot of the process data for this thesis came from this sort of 
data collection. The problem is there is a department in the RMC which is dedicated to 
data collection and distribution and there is a tool which is supposed to be used to gather 
that data for the teams. NMD is designed to collect most of the data that is being tracked 
separately. With increased effort from the MTs and the CTs to input these data points into 
the system this waste could be reduced.  
In some cases, the data points are tedious and require multiple entries. That type 
of feedback needs to occur so that adjustments can be made to improve the system. 
Beyond this, the MTs and CTs are preparing the awards board reports manually, even 
though these reports are all collectable in NMD. The inherent problem with individual 
MTs and CTs collecting this data and calculating it themselves in Excel is the accuracy of 
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the data is dependent on the experience level of the user. This makes the metrics by 
which the contractor is being reviewed less objective. If a central authority was in charge 
of the metrics, with a means to dispute the metrics for the MT and CT prior to awards 
board, the metrics could become more objective. Standardization of metrics, and using 
the Metrics Department to lead the effort, is important for objectivity but it is also 
important for avoiding potential manipulation.  
Another point to consider in regards to metrics is agreement between the 
contractor and government on metrics standards. The contractor has grounds to refute the 
appearance of subjective claims if the government and contractor never agreed on the 
parameters of a metric in advance. For example, the contractor uses business days for 
measurement of processing times for reports. The government uses actual days.  
B. THEORY OF CONSTRAINTS AND WAITING/QUEUEING 
The theoretical bottleneck for four out of five of the ships is the SBS when 
processing the CFRs. Their maximum throughput rate experienced in the availability 
normalized to the rate of conversion of CFRs to RCCs returns the theoretical throughput 
rate. The MKI (See Figure 15) was the only maintenance team that was able to shift the 
theoretical bottleneck to the contracting team. In theory, the bottleneck is the SBS and in 
accordance with the theory of constraints the entire process should be slowed to the rate 
of the bottleneck. The resource constraint at the bottleneck is labor hours of the SBS 
conducting reviews of CFRs. To relieve the bottleneck the number of SBS should be 
increased to raise the capacity of the entire system.  
The problem with this particular system is that each entity has multiple 
responsibilities. The sole purpose of an SBS is not to review and approve RCCs and 
CFRs. For a full description of the responsibilities of the SBS, see the Appendix. With 
numerous and varied responsibilities comes the ability to concentrate on the most 
pressing tasks. This can be seen in all of the throughput rate charts. The level of effort 
exaggerates the waiting at individual tasks in the process.  
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In addition, the SBS is the primary resource constraint in both of the initial steps 
of the process meaning any deficiency in output by the SBS is exaggerated on the entire 
system. This makes the SBS crucial to timely processing of reports.  
The theory of constraints requires the process pace be reduced to the bottleneck 
speed to make the process efficient. This reduces queuing times and wasted time over-
producing reports which will wait in subsequent queues. In the event of a disparity in 
effort the most efficient mechanism for process improvement is to increase coordination. 
WEM displays coordination the best in Figure 14.  
The rate of throughput increases and decreases naturally throughout the 
availability. In the beginning of an availability, work begins and reports rapidly increase 
as they are developed and submitted. As the availability continues report rates start to 
decline because the number of active jobs decreases. Additionally, the number of RCCs 
accepted starts to decline as growth work no longer fits in the prescribed window for the 
availability. Each ship’s RCC submission histogram looks slightly different but HPR 
displays this trend in Figure 19. This figure displays the rapid increase in RCCs, which is 
directly proportional to the CFRs submitted. The middle of the availability is at a steady 
state with some variability and in the last couple months the pace of reports declines.  
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Figure 19.  HPR RCC Submissions 
 
This figure is a chart of the RCC Submissions for USS Harper’s Ferry availability 
prepared by LT Donald Northrup. The data for this chart was consolidated from Naval 
Maintenance Database.   
Considering each of the ships in execution a trend emerges that four out of the 
five ships are reactionary in their throughput rate. WEM in Figure 14 displays a 
coordinated effort of the three entities as the level of effort is stepped up together. Each 
of the other ships displays a rapid increase in throughput for the MT. This is followed in 
the next month, or in some cases two months, by increases in effort by the contractor and 
the contracting team to meet the growth in queue.  
a. Calibration of Effort 
To maximize the efficiency in the process the three entities must coordinate their 
increase in effort. This is primarily done through constant communication. WEM’s PM 
specified that there was never a CFR submitted to his MT without a verbal warning 
issued by the contractor. This allows the MT to reduce setup times by looking up 
historical data and finding and starting templates. This communication must be coupled 

















the rate of submissions to the contracting team to allow them to prepare for the 
impending response from the contractor. A contracting team could be working on as 
many as five availabilities at one time. The contractor is executing multiple contracts at 
once. The SBS, the reviewer of CFRs and creator of RCCs, is also responsible for 
monitoring the contractor on site, conducting check points and creating independent 
government estimates. Constant communication is instrumental to the three entities 
shifting their focus before a buildup in their respective queue.  
The table attached to Figure 20 is the average of total RCC cycle times for each 
month of PHB’s availability. Figure 20 is also the chart for PHB’s throughput rates 
throughput the ship’s availability. They are coupled in this figure for ease of reference. 
From the months of April to October the largest disparity in effort between the three 
entities exists. This period is also where the worst cycle times of the availability are 
found. In June, when the CT and Contractor are close in output, the average cycle time 
for the availability is at its lowest for that period.  
In January and February, when the three entities move jointly the cycle times fall 
to their lowest to that point in the availability. From February to July, when the 
throughput rates are as close to identical as they get for the availability, the cycle times 
are at their lowest. Finally, in August and September when the level of effort diverges, 
the cycle time increases by approximately three working days. This ship shows that there 
is a correlation between congruence in throughput rate and overall cycle time for the 
availability. The slight divergence leading to an increase in approximately three days of 
cycle times shows this is significant.  
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Figure 20.  PHB RCC Cycle Time and Throughput Analysis 
 
This figure is representative of the throughput of RCC Submission, COPA Response and 
ATP throughout execution of the USS Pearl Harbor availability with a table of RCC 
Cycle time by month prepared by LT Donald Northrup. The data for this chart was 
consolidated from Naval Maintenance Database and data kept by the USS Pearl Harbor 
contracting team.   
C. RELATIONSHIP ANALYSIS 
Dyer specifically speaks to the ease of adjusting internal procedures and practices 
to improve efficiency (Dyer, 2009). Chrysler’s second stage of process improvement 
required involving the supplier in product development and process improvement which 
was more difficult because it required changing the nature of their relationship. This 
second statement is what begins to draw comparisons with depot maintenance in the 
Navy. Table 6 displays the chart Dyer and Ouchi use to draw comparisons between the 
traditional U.S. model of supplier relations to the Japanese partnering model.  
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Table 6.   Characteristics of Vendor Relations in Japan and the United States  
  
Source: Dyer, J. H., & Ouchi, W. G. (1993). Japanese-style partnerships: Giving 
companies a competitive edge. Sloan Management Review, 35(1), 51–63 
The traditional U.S. model from 1993 parallels the current status of Surface Navy 
depot maintenance. I provide the comparable terminology or precedent the government 
uses for the most glaring line items that reflects a difficult relationship between the 
government and its suppliers.  
Department or Firm Focus: Three out of four data points used to characterize 
success in the Duncan and Hartl (2015) study are focused on results metrics for the 
government instead of value chain process improvement. GW/NW is the combination of 
the cost of growth and new work added during the availability with no framework for the 
cost driver or issues with the process. Specifically, these metrics do not account for the 
cost proposal initially made by the contractor, it only accounts for the definitized cost 
from the contract and the final settled value.  
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Lost Operational Days is schedule compliance as the difference between the 
contracted date of completion and the actual date of completion. This metric provides no 
context as to the problems with the process which is the same for On-Time Completion. 
In the end, the government is most concerned with reducing the cost incurred 
which is reflected in the decision to increase competition and shift risk to the contractor. 
Increasing efficiency along the entire value stream will reduce costs across both parties, 
build trust and retain a healthier industrial base.  
Government defined needs, specialization and planning: The government spends 
time writing the precise procedure (EPCP/PCP) for conducting work that is beyond the 
technical authority of the MT. In some instances, decentralized decision making, 
including decisions made by the contractor could be technically acceptable. They require 
proper oversight by the MT and follow up by technical authority, but the contractor is 
never given the opportunity to suggest a procedure.  
In addition, the contractor has no incentive to be innovative in saving the 
government money. This requires a cost sharing contract structure such as an incentive 
type contract. This type of contract would negotiate the sharing percentage of saved 
money in advance of the contract. Additionally, it could share losses incurred up until a 
pre-defined point. 
Communication is sporadic and problem driven: Weekly meetings are conducted 
with ships force to update the crew on status of job completion in addition to a weekly 
meeting between the commanding officer of a ship, the RMC CO, the PM, PE and a 
contractor representative. The central focus of this meeting is the status of the ship’s 
availability. Process improvement meetings are happening regularly within the RMC but 
a contractor representative is not participating in process improvement measures. The act 
of including the contractor and including their suggestions for improvement throughout 
the entire process would bear full value stream process improvement.   
Precise contracts which split economic benefits beforehand: As previously stated, 
there is no sharing of economic benefits with the contractor. Any money saved by the 
contractor is recouped by the government, which provides no incentive for the contractor 
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to perform more efficiently. This is especially true now that the government is shifting to 
fixed-price contracts and away from cost-plus contracts where the contractor may have 
won an award fee.  
MSMO contracts were supposed to increase cooperation between the contractor 
and the government and reverse an inefficient relationship (Duncan & Hartl). The act of 
changing the contract type to better benefit the contractor, to a cost plus award fee type, is 
only half of the equation required to improve the relationship. Dyer points out that it is 
the easier piece of the equation to execute (Dyer, 1995). Including the contractor in 
process improvement, rewarding the contractor for increased efficiency, constructive 
communication on a regular basis and actually building trust with the contractor is the 
more difficult, but necessary task.  
Until the Navy RMCs build functioning relationships with the contractor, there is 
no contract type that will fix the Navy’s cost and schedule issues.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION  
Chrysler and GM proved in the early ’90s that organizations can learn lessons and 
change their processes. These automakers observed their competitors and implemented 
policies which ultimately increased efficiency and profit margins. The Navy’s 
maintenance organization can do the same in the current environment. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current construct is a teaming arrangement between the contractor and the 
government. Cooperation between the parties should occur on a regularly scheduled basis 
to discuss process improvement.  
Recommendation 1: Schedule weekly or bi-weekly meetings between executive 
level leadership of the local RMC and the contractor to review processes, consider 
improvements and discuss progress.  
Recommendation 2: Increase the number of SBS assigned during a standard 
availability. Theoretical Bottleneck on four out of five ships is the SBS based on 
maximum capacity and conversion from CFR to RCC. In addition, the dependency of 
both of the first two steps of the process on the same resource, the SBS, results in greater 
need of SBS to properly reduce the bottleneck.  
Recommendation 3: Increase communication levels and coordination between 
MT, KTR and CT. The level of effort is increasing waiting times at individual work 
stations. Verbal "heads up" from the contractor on ALL CFRs was observed to help 
reduce setup times. A second related recommendation is required reports of queue levels 
above a prescribed level to the CO of the RMC. This applies to all three entities to aid the 
process improvement review with the contractor.  
Recommendation 4: Increase quality control standards and increase accountability 
for PMs. Rework is an issue. It is the responsibility of the PM to review the RCC and 
IGE. If available, shift more of the review burden to the Project Officer. Based on the 
ships reviewed, an RCC to WI ratio greater than three requires a review of the MT 
 72
practices by a senior PM.  Additionally, RCC to WI ration greater than three should be 
addressed with the contractor charged with advanced planning. Potential loss of award 
fees is warranted for excessive changes.  
Recommendation 5: Invest in increasing user friendliness of NMD and mandate 
its use by the MT. This will increase user input, which will allow for more granularities 
in metric analysis. It will also reduce the man hours used tracking metrics by the 
MT/CTs. Lastly, it will increase objectivity used for award fee board metrics.  
B. IS THE NAVY’S CURRENT CONSTRUCT PREPARED TO SHIFT TO A 
NEW CONTRACTING STRATEGY?  
As stated in Chapter I, when choosing contract types the FAR is explicit about 
items that should be considered. For this particular case two items directly apply:  
 The government should compare a cost estimate to the contractor to 
provide the basis for negotiations. It is essential to consider the amount of 
uncertainty within the scope of work to apply a fair amount of 
responsibility on the contractor for cost.  
 The higher the complexity of the work should result in a higher 
assumption of risk by the government. As a requirement recurs the risk 
should shift, in time, to the contractor.  
(FAR 16.104) 
The government should assume a higher percentage of the risk for jobs with high 
complexity. The complexity of the work to be performed is judged by the level of 
uncertainty within the project as specified by the first consideration. At this time, the 
government is changing the contract greater than two times per work item in six out of 
seven ships with available data. In one instance five times per work item (see Table 2, p. 
54). This implies that a high level of complexity still exists for the work being performed.  
Additionally, both of these considerations are based on the premise that an 
efficient and fully functional process is in place for estimating cost and defining recurring 
requirements. As previously discussed, the process requires adjustment within the firm 
and increased coordination with the contractor.  
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Until the process is improved, the government should assume the higher 
percentage of risk and shifting to a new contracting strategy is not recommended.  
C. IS THIS NEW CONTRACT STRATEGY THE BEST DECISION FOR 
REDUCING COST AND KEEPING SCHEDULE? 
No, as previously discussed, the government is not in a position to shift more of 
the risk to the contractor. Therefore, the best decision for reducing cost and keeping 
schedule is to improve the process until such time as requirements can be accurately 
defined. Instituting the prescribed process improvement recommendations coupled with 
increased coordination with the contractor will result in an environment where 
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APPENDIX.  LIST OF SHIPBUILDING SPECIALISTS’ 
RESPONSIBILITIES  
The full list of SBS Action Items from the SWRMC SBS Desk Guide:  
 a. Review and comply with this desk guide and all applicable laws, 
references, SWRMC Instructions and guidance provided by the Government of the 
United States, U.S. Navy, PACFLT and SWRMC. 
 
 b. After assignment to a project/availability by the Class Team Leader and 
assignment of work items by the Project Manager, obtain and review all drawings, 
technical manuals, design memos, manufacturer’s instructions and references required by 
the work item(s).  
 
  (1)  Ensure the current version of the NAVSEA Standard Items is 
utilized.   
   
  (2) Review all work specifications assigned to you for technical and 
quality accuracy in addition to compliance with Volume 7, Chapter 4 appendix 4-E of 
JFMM. Submit an Engineering Service Request (ESR) for technical review if required. 
 
  (3)  Review/Update NMD checkpoint module for each work item 
assigned to you (“G” points only) 
 
  During Advance Planning, the SBS will conduct specification reviews and 
develop an Independent Government Estimate as required.  
 
 c. Inspect the work site, when allowed by the Project Manager, before the 
start of the contract and note any conditions that are not in accordance with work items, 
will disrupt schedules, or cause additional work requirements.  Document these 
conditions and alert the Project Manager for direction.  Examples include, missing 
lagging, loose deck plates, piping interferences, etc. 
 
 d. Review the references for applicability to actual conditions and ensure the 
contractor adheres to the requirements of all work items and is using references that were 
in place at contract award. 
 
 e. Maintain a significant events logbook daily and additional records  
 
 f. Review contractor’s schedules for purchase orders/government furnished 
material(GFM)/contractor furnished material(CFM), long lead time material (LLTM) 
lists, as applicable, to ensure material required is ordered and has acceptable Estimated 
Delivery Dates (EDD) to support the schedule.  Anticipate and initiate actions that may 
be necessary to minimize schedule impact by unsatisfactory material delivery dates. 
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  (1) Inform the Project Manager of any anticipated or ongoing work 
stoppage or problems concerning a work item based on government furnished equipment 
(GFE), GFM or delay in government furnished information (GFI), such as issues with 
contracting a work item to a subcontractor or answering of reports.  These instances shall 
be documented in the significant events logbook  
 
 g. Conduct oversight coordination and inspection of work-related 
environmental issues associated with Ship’s Force and contractor’s operations.  This 
effort includes but is not limited to hazardous material (HAZMAT) and hazardous waste 
(HW) handling, removal, storage, transportation and disposal. 
 As directed by PM, conduct safety inspection jointly with contractor, Ship’s Force 
and Government Environmental Safety and Health (ESH) Representatives. 
 
h. Observe check points identified in the work specification when they are 
presented by the contractor, witnessing required equipment or systems tests, 
accomplishing random in-process inspections at the work site to determine contractor 
compliance with the requirements of the specification, and determining the effectiveness 
of the contractor’s QA program.  Enter all G-checkpoints in NMD.  
 
i. Review, evaluate and answer contractor's condition found reports (CFRs) 
including their recommendations for additional work and provide rationale for approval 
or disapproval  
 
 j. Make decisions to ensure quality of the product such as, but not limited to 
work item clarity, material requests, quality assurance requirements, etc. within their span 
of control and are not constructive changes or deviations to the contract. 
 
(1) A constructive change to a contract occurs whenever the 
government through its action or lack of required action causes the contractor to 
depart from plan or perform other than as specified in the contract.  Ensure a 
Request for Contract Change (RCC) is written for any contract modification to 
prevent a constructive change to occur. 
 
(2) A deviation is defined as any action which is not in accordance 
with the work item, no matter how minor.  Deviations require technical authority 
action–if approved, an RCC will be required to initiate the work.  Failure to write 
an RCC will cause a constructive change to occur. 
 
  (3) When working outside of one’s specialized skill set, request 
assistance from other Shipbuilding Specialists, Quality Assurance Specialist (QAS), 




 k. Initiate action(s) such as, but not limited to writing Requests for Contract 
Change (RCC), Corrective Action Report (CAR) Engineering Service Request (ESR), 
Progress reports or the coordination of efforts to prevent problems or work stoppages. 
 
(1) Initiate either a method A or method B Corrective Action Request 
(CAR) when required  
 
(2) Write new and growth work items when requested by the Project 
Manager and create RCCs when an existing work item requires contractual 
modification.   
 
(3) Calculate estimates using historical costs in NMD, trade 
knowledge, vendor quotes, ship checks, business climate and information from 
Project Manager and other Shipbuilding Specialists.   
 
(4) Develop, review and assist in negotiating modifications to 
original/new work specifications for work to be accomplished by contractors.  
Assist the ACO with the Government negotiation position. 
 
 l. Determine the physical progress, as a percentage of work completed, of 
each work item and each contract modification assigned.  This information is updated 
weekly in the Navy Maintenance Database (NMD) that is used in calculating the 
contractor’s entitlement to progress payments as well as in evaluating the contractor’s 
schedule performance.   
 
 m. When assigned to a MSMO contract, the Shipbuilding Specialist shall 
accomplish cost monitoring duties  
 
 n. Maintain effective lines of communication between the Project Manager, 
Contractor, Ship’s Force, Planning Yard on-site rep, and Alteration Installation Teams 
(AITs) for the purpose of problem solving, coordination and mutual discussion of work 
items. 
 
  (1) Provide current information and progress updates relating to 
assigned work items to the Project Manager 
 
  (2) Interface with members of the Ship’s Force to provide current 
project information, notify responsible personnel of scheduled evolutions and solicit 
required or desirable Ship’s Force assistance. 
 
  (3) Work with Planning Yard on-site representatives and engineering 
liaisons to help resolve technical problems. 
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 o. Attend daily coordination; weekly progress; work coordination; work item 
scoping meetings as well as other meetings scheduled and unscheduled as determined by 
the Project Manager. 
 
 p. The Shipbuilding Specialist assigned weekend or night shift work shall 
perform duties in accordance with Chapter 2 Section B of this desk guide. 
 
q. Investigate as necessary the contract guarantee to help determine whether 
failure of equipment or systems covered by the guarantee clause is the responsibility of 
the Government or the contractor. 
 
r. Provide lessons learned and feedback reports related to deficient or 
inefficient work specifications or work authorizations to the appropriate planning group 
for use in improving future maintenance requirements. Provide written reports to support 
Lessons Learned Conferences, Award Fee Evaluations and the Contractor Performance 
Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). 
(Waterfront OPS, 2011, pp. 15–18) 
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